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ARTICLES
Mission, Margin, and Trust in the Nonprofit Health Care
Enterprise
Thomas L. Greaney, J.D.* and Kathleen M. Boozang, J.D., LL.M.†

INTRODUCTION
Lost in the recent flurry of legal activity occasioned by corporate
integration, disintegration, and scandalous episodes of managerial abuse,
the law governing charitable corporations remains neglected and
thoroughly muddled. Still unsettled are central issues regarding the
accountability of directors and management, legal standards governing
organic changes by nonprofit institutions, and mechanisms to ensure
fidelity to the organization’s charitable mission. For nonprofit corporations
in the health care sector, which represent a large proportion of all health
services supplied nationwide, particularly charity care, these shortcomings
have had serious repercussions.
1
The adaptation of for-profit corporate law to charitable corporations
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for Health Law Studies, Saint Louis
University.
† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Seton Hall University.
We gratefully acknowledge the comments of James Fishman and Evelyn Brody, and the
outstanding research assistance of Allana Holub, Patricia McManus, and Jeanie Montrey.
Our Yale editors were superb, for which we thank them.
1. The structural hallmark of the nonprofit firm is the absence of owners, or
shareholders, who share in its profits. Professor Henry Hansmann famously characterized
the legal regime governing nonprofits as imposing a “nondistribution constraint,” requiring
nonprofits to reinvest net earnings in the entity and precluding any distribution among
individuals who control the organization. Henry Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 837, 840 (1980). As used in this article, “charitable corporations” are a
1
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has been clumsy and ineffective at best; in its worst moments, it has proved
perverse. Legal doctrine has never adequately addressed the accountability
void that results from charitable corporations’ lack of shareholders and
2
market for corporate control. Nor has it confronted squarely the raison
d’etre of nonprofits—that they exist not primarily to make money but to
pursue charitable objectives. When dealing with transactions that implicate
the nonprofit enterprise’s purpose, such as conversions, closures, and
abandonment of mission, courts and regulators are essentially left to their
own devices. The law has failed to furnish guidance on the bedrock
questions surrounding accountability and mission.
Confronted with ambiguous law governing oversight of the nonprofit
enterprise, state attorneys general have resurrected charitable trust
principles to facilitate more aggressive intervention in the managerial
decisions of nonprofit boards. This activism by attorneys general, which
predominantly focuses on hospitals and health insurers, addresses two
broad categories of activities: alleged mismanagement by the nonprofit’s
board or its officers and organic changes that alter the status of the
community hospital or nonprofit health plan. In both instances, the
attorneys general quite properly serve as surrogate stakeholders for the
3
societal and charitable interests inevitably implicated in such matters. Yet
subset of nonprofit corporations that have as their purpose charitable activities as required
by the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004).
2. Academic accounts diverge sharply over whether nonprofit corporations can be
thought of as having owners, and if so, who those owners are. See, e.g., David M. Cutler & Jill
R. Horwitz, Converting Hospitals from Not-for-Profit to For-Profit Status: Why and What Effects?, in
THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 45 (David M. Cuttler ed., 2000) (asserting that the public
does not own nonprofits); Jennifer Kuan, The Phantom Profits of the Opera: Nonprofit Ownership
in the Arts As a Make-Buy Decision, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 507, 517 (2001) (arguing that
nonprofits have an owner—the board); Denise Lee Ping, Note, The Business Judgment Rule:
Should It Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 931 (2003) (suggesting that
nonprofits have no real owners); see also Lawrence Singer, Realigning Catholic Healthcare:
Bridging Legal and Church Control in a Consolidating Market, 72 TUL. L. REV. 159, 162 (1997)
(raising the question of whether a Catholic hospital is owned by the religious institute
sponsor or the community being served).
3. Governmental enforcement actions against charities go back to fifteenth century
England when the attorney general represented the Crown as parens patriae. NAT’L ASS’N OF
ATTORNEYS GEN., STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES 184 (1990). In the
United States, the authority of attorneys general to enforce charitable trusts was originally
found in the common law; gradually, however, states enacted a variety of statutes that vested
expanded powers in attorneys general to regulate charitable trusts and charitable
corporations. Id. at 185; see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL LAW AND STATE REGULATION 54-55 (2004).
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their actions increasingly run squarely into two other important values:
nonprofit managers’ need for the autonomy, discretion, and flexibility
essential to fulfilling their charitable missions; and the need to foster
coordinated public policies governing the provision of safety net health
care resources.
Our focus in this Article is on the legal oversight of the dominant
species of nonprofit health care organizations as measured by revenues
4
and public policy concerns: the “commercial” nonprofit corporation,
specifically nonprofit hospitals and health plans. These nonprofit hospitals
5
constitute a large proportion of the nation’s hospital capacity,
representing billions of dollars of charitable assets. As nonprofit health
care enterprises also constitute a substantial percentage of the nation’s
6
nursing homes and comprise many of the nation’s largest health insurers
7
and managed care entities, these firms play a central role in providing
much of the nation’s safety net services; as a result, they take on added
significance (and earn regulatory scrutiny).
The modern nonprofit health care enterprise faces a rapidly evolving
4. As Henry Hansmann’s typology suggested some twenty years ago, the commercial
nonprofit uniquely receives most of its funds from the sale of services with an expectation
that it will return societal benefits in the form of charitable services or “community
benefits” from its profits. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129
U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981) [hereinafter Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law]. For
more recent analysis, see HENRY HANSMANN ET AL., OWNERSHIP FORM AND TRAPPED CAPITAL IN
THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 266, 2002),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=313827 [hereinafter HANSMANN ET AL., OWNERSHIP].
5. See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and Ethics of
Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1352 (2003) (“Of the nearly 2800 urban acute
care hospitals, slightly fewer than 20 percent are government hospitals run by state, local,
and federal governments, slightly fewer than 20 percent are for-profit hospitals, and the
remainder are not-for-profit corporations.”).
6. Approximately 28.6% of nursing homes are owned by not-for-profit corporations.
See id.
7. See generally JACK NEEDLEMAN, NON-PROFIT TO FOR-PROFIT CONVERSIONS BY HOSPITALS
AND HEALTH PLANS: A REVIEW (1996), http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/research/
whitepapers/wp5.cfm. Dr. Needleman concludes that it is impossible to accurately estimate
health plan conversions, which generally occur as changes in corporate form rather than
acquisitions. Id. “Many of the converted HMOs have since merged with one another or with
historically for-profit insurers. Six firms now dominate the national HMO market.” Id.
Importantly, Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans (the Blues), which were established during
the depression to provide expansive hospital and physician coverage and were historically
nonprofit in their orientation, changed their requirements in 1994 by eliminating the
requirement that their licensees be organized as nonprofit corporations. Id.
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economic and technological environment—as well as well-capitalized for8
profit rivals. Owing to its charitable and tax-exempt status, it must also
undergo close scrutiny from community and regulatory overseers. Some of
the most controversial legal questions arise from hospitals’ efforts to adapt
to ensure their continued relevance and financial stability. Prominent
9
examples include shifting acute to out-patient services, relocating or
10
11
closing a hospital facility, affiliating with multi-state systems, and joint
venturing with for-profit entities or with religious groups that require
12
changes in services. Nonprofit health plans fit uncomfortably in this legal
landscape—some now claim that they are not charitable entities, and
indeed, abandoned their original “mission” decades ago. Congress
recognized this when it began taxing health insurers, and the IRS generally
13
resists according charitable status to HMOs. Nonetheless, attorneys
general and other regulators have intervened aggressively in many
instances in which health plans sought to convert to for-profit status.
Although in most states it is unquestionably the responsibility of
attorneys general to ensure the preservation and appropriate disposition of
14
charitable assets, we question whether in its current unsettled and
ambiguous state, the law can adequately guide their actions. It is also
questionable whether attorneys general have the resources or expertise to
engage in the detailed assessments of the business and health policy issues
surrounding the appropriate deployment of charitable assets that such
decisions implicate. Frequently presented in a politically charged

8. Several factors contribute to the changing landscape of health care and the
increasing need to compete with for-profits. With governmental regulation of the health
field receding and market forces becoming dominant, medicine has taken on a primarily
business (rather than service) orientation, and the line between the standards governing
for-profit and nonprofit enterprises has blurred. David B. Starkweather, Profit Making by
Nonprofit Hospitals, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY 105 (David C.
Hammack & Dennis R. Young eds., 1993).
9. See Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
10. See id.; Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235 A.2d 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1967). See
generally N.H. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NEW HAMPSHIRE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON OPTIMA
HEALTH (1998), at http://doj.nh.gov/publications/optima1.html.
11. See Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 245-46 (S.D. 2003).
12. See Nathan Littaauer Hosp. Ass’n v. Spitzer, 287 A.D.2d 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
See generally N.H. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10.
13. I.R.C. § 501(m) (2004); see also Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and
Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 1017 (2004) [hereinafter Brody,
Whose Public?].
14. See infra note 277 and accompanying text.
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atmosphere, these enforcement decisions may reflect policy judgments
and preferences that go beyond the attorneys generals’ competence or
mandate.
The central issue addressed in this Article is how fidelity to the mission
of the charitable health care corporation should be monitored. Part I sets
the stage, providing a brief overview of the economic underpinnings of the
regulation of nonprofit health care players. It surveys the economic
literature, concluding that ownership form is not the decisive factor in the
cost, quality, or efficiency of hospital services. However, the record is a
mixed one and many benefits associated with the nonprofit sector are not
readily quantified; others may be enhanced by a more supportive
regulatory environment. Part II introduces some of the most notorious
interventions by attorneys general in nonprofit health care and explains
the legal means by which regulators attempt to accomplish their goals. Part
III begins the analysis of the legal framework in which nonprofit
governance is analyzed, finding corporate fiduciary law muddled and too
permissive in its oversight of nonprofit corporate governance. Part IV turns
to charitable trust law, which it concludes is doctrinally inapposite and
pragmatically unsuited to govern business conduct in the contemporary
health care market. The consequence has been to enable attorneys general
and charitable enforcers to inappropriately stretch legal doctrine, thereby
exacerbating confusion for nonprofit boards over the boundaries of their
discretion and the role of charitable mission in decision-making. Finally,
Part V offers guidance for the future direction of law and policy governing
nonprofit health care firms. It advances the normative perspective that the
law should maximize opportunities for nonprofits to fulfill their charitable
missions, but should insist on more than nebulous assurances that society
will receive tangible benefits. For nonprofit corporate doctrine, this Article
proposes that nonprofit corporate law incorporate a principle of “mission
primacy”—a doctrinal recognition that the nonprofit corporation’s
articulated charitable mission is its central objective. Further, nonprofit
directors should enjoy a presumption of deference to define and, within
limits, alter that mission to serve the public’s interest and preserve the
relevance and financial stability of the charitable entity. Judges and
regulators should read mission-centered values into interpretations of the
traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. This approach should
preserve managerial discretion to balance the various constituents of the
nonprofit firm, including donors, consumers, and the community.
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I. THE NATURE OF THE COMMERCIAL
NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE
Before considering state regulation of the nonprofit health care
enterprise as a charitable entity, it is essential to first understand the role
these “commercial nonprofits” play in health care delivery and coverage in
the United States. Theoretically, charitable corporations are mission-driven
institutions established to benefit the communities that they ostensibly
serve. By all relevant indicia, nonprofits in the health industry are
significant, profit-seeking enterprises that compete vigorously (and, for the
most part, successfully) against for-profit rivals. Empirical studies reach
varying conclusions on the question of whether nonprofits in the health
care industry satisfactorily fulfill their purpose of supplying essential public
goods and substituting for government in maintaining the health services
15
safety net.
However, these appraisals exhibit strong normative
disagreements about what society expects from nonprofits. Also unclear is
whether the vast array of laws affecting nonprofit entities enhances the
sector’s provision of benefits and accountability to the community or
merely establishes minimal standards that encourage a “race to the
bottom.”
This Part examines the economic underpinnings for the public
policies and legal doctrine that govern the nonprofit health care sector. It
first provides, as background, a brief overview and critique of the
theoretical justifications for the existence of the nonprofit firm. We find in
this account no grounds for confidence that the nonprofit sector will
automatically supply promised public benefits. Next we examine the
economic literature, which paints a decidedly mixed picture. The
nonprofit form currently plays a modest role in helping the hospital sector
to achieve the ends of cost, quality, and access, but appears to have little if
any similar salutary role with respect to health plans. We caution, however,
that historical evidence may not provide an accurate assessment of the
potential of the nonprofit sector if, as suggested by our analysis of legal
doctrine, those firms are not given sufficient flexibility or incentives to
achieve those goals.
A. Agency Cost, Trust, and Mission in Nonprofit Organizations
The explanation of why nonprofit firms exist provides the foundation
15. To qualify for exempt status as a charitable 501(c)(3) organization, they must be
operated “exclusively” for charitable or other exempt purposes. See generally St. David’s
Health Care Sys. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003).
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for all discussions about their legal characteristics. In his seminal work,
Henry Hansmann suggested that the prohibition on nonprofits disbursing
their profits, denominated the “nondistribution constraint,” provides a
mechanism for overcoming the significant information asymmetries in the
16
services those firms provide. Hansmann claimed that the institutional
commitment not to distribute profits to private parties helps overcome
agency costs by inducing patrons (customers and donors) to trust
nonprofits. The theory suggests that for “commercial nonprofits” like
hospitals and third party payors, the constraint ameliorates consumers’
17
inability to accurately gauge the quality of services. The nondistribution
constraint does double duty: It not only explains the existence of the
nonprofit firm, but, in the words of Professor Evelyn Brody, it “keeps
[them] honest, ensuring the dedication of assets and effort towards
18
performing good deeds.” Consumers do not have to undertake the costly
and perhaps impossible task of monitoring nonprofits’ delivery of services,
thereby further reducing agency costs.
On closer examination, however, this rosy scenario collapses. First,
multiple layers of informational and transaction cost problems are
associated with the complex services provided by nonprofits. Even if the
nondistribution constraint fosters trust, it does not solve the principalagent problem between managers and directors of nonprofit firms. Board
19
members of nonprofits are typically unpaid volunteers, many of whom are
recruited for services other than providing supervision or assisting
20
management. Most students of nonprofit boards question their capacity
21
to effectively supervise management.

16. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 4.
17. Id. at 505.
18. Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and
For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 459 (1996) [hereinafter Brody,
Agents Without Principals].
19. See Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 2, at 63.
20. See Peggy Sasso, Searching for Trust in the Not-for-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the
Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1485, 1539-40 (2003) (arguing
that boards should include more insiders to increase trust between directors and
management and to enable education of lay trustees who are generally not selected for
their expertise in the nonprofit’s enterprise).
21. See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 18, at 499-500 (summarizing Richard
Heimovics & Robert D. Herman, The Salient Management Skills: A Conceptual Framework for a
Curriculum for Managers in Nonprofit Organizations, 19 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 295, 307-08, 309
n.13 (1989)) (“We were unprepared for the fact that both actors and observers in our
research found the [nonprofit chief executive] as responsible for all nonprofit
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In addition, the nonprofit firm justifies its existence by reference to a
“mission” that includes subsidization of worthy causes with the proceeds
from commercial sales. The nondistribution constraint cannot meliorate
contract failure given management’s objective (indeed “mission”) to
accomplish charitable goals through revenue shifting and its unsupervised
discretion to do so; in short, despite nondistribution, the patron of the
nonprofit firm has no assurance that the nonprofit will fulfill her
22
aspirations. Finally, the Hansmann analysis leaves unanswered the
question of how, given information asymmetry, consumers can distinguish
one nonprofit from another. In the end, market failure cannot by itself
23
explain the continued existence of the nonprofit hospital. A more
plausible account may be found in the complex agency arrangements that
pervade health-purchasing decisions. First, health care decisions are the
product of multi-tiered agency relationships. Consumers’ “choice” of
hospitals is strongly influenced by intermediaries, namely their physicians
24
and insurance plans. In turn, employers typically select health plans. At
each stage of the decision-making process, agents are operating with highly
imperfect information about the services they are selecting and about the
25
preferences of their principals (the patient/consumer).
Physician intermediaries may have multiple reasons for preferring
nonprofit hospitals, including their own autonomy and self-interests as well
26
as quality of care considerations peculiarly within their expertise. To the

organizational outcomes, both successes and failures.”).
22. See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 18, at 508-09 (“No matter how
meritorious the cross-subsidization, how can a donor or patron be sure that her money is
being used to provide the service that she wants? This pattern illustrates that the
nondistribution constraint, while perhaps helpful, is not a sufficient bond to align the
interests of management with the interests of patrons.”).
23. Hansmann conceded as much in later writings, contending that information
asymmetry with a “lag effect” caused nonprofit hospitals’ predominance. See HENRY
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 236 (1996). Nonprofit hospitals gained an initial
foothold as donative institutions prior to the advent of widespread private insurance and
public payment programs. Hansmann argues that “forces of inertia” have kept consumers
from switching to for-profits despite their superior efficiency. Id.
24. Catherine Hoffman et al., Holes in the Insurance System—Who Lacks Coverage and Why,
32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 390, 391 (2004).
25. Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and
Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 203 (1997) (describing market imperfections and
agency relationships in health care services).
26. See generally MARK V. PAULY, DOCTORS AND THEIR WORKSHOPS: ECONOMIC MODELS OF
PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR (1980); Jerry Cromwell, Barriers to Achieving a Cost-Effective Workforce Mix:
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extent that doctors prefer hospitals for selfish reasons, agency failure is the
root cause for the steady predominance of the nonprofit form. This
explanation is obviously inconsistent with an efficient market and militates
against public policies and legal doctrines that favor the form. If, on the
other hand, physicians’ election to affiliate with and steer patients to
nonprofit institutions is an exercise of professional judgment that helps
overcome their patients’ information deficits as to quality and other salient
non-price factors, the nonprofit form is efficiency-enhancing and should
be encouraged. Unfortunately, empirical evidence is lacking as to which
scenario most plausibly explains physicians’ hospital preferences.
B. Economic Analyses of the Nonprofit Enterprise in the Health Care Industry
Few contemporary hospitals and virtually no nonprofit health plans
reflect the popular image of a charity—an institution selflessly dedicated to
all comers, irrespective of ability to pay. Quantitatively measured solely in
27
terms of providing health services to the poor, hospitals offer at best
marginal returns to society on its “investment,” while nonprofit payors
offer negligible direct subsidies to the needy and only slight benefits

Lessons from Anesthesiology, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1331, 1354 (1999) (claiming
hospitals remain, as much as ever, “doctors’ workshops”).
27. Scholars and public policy makers disagree about what comprises the community
benefit that should be uniquely contributed by nonprofit hospitals. Uncompensated care is
frequently cited because it is presumably measurable. In 2001, acute-care hospitals spent
$21.5 billion on uncompensated care, or six percent of total expenses, which is the lowest
percentage recorded since 1983. Patrick Reilly, Charitable Dropoff: Uncompensated Care Drops to
Lowest Level in Years, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 17, 2003, at 4. However, an exclusive focus on
uncompensated care discounts the important value of the maintenance of “loss leader”
services, community education, and research. Further, controversies and data collection
problems surround the issue of defining and calculating the amount of uncompensated
care provided by nonprofits. Charity care rendered is not synonymous with accounting
measures such as bad debt. In addition, calculations must include offset for payments
received from government sources and other forms of support received. Comparisons
across sectors require resolving the role to be afforded tax payments by for-profits. A public
good framework would reflect uncompensated care, uncompensated community services,
medical research, and taxes, and potentially includes federal health plan shortfalls, price
discounts on private pay patients, and losses on medical education. Sean Nicholson et al.,
Measuring Community Benefits Provided by For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 19 HEALTH AFF.
168, 169 (2000); see also Jill A. Marsteller et al., Nonprofit Conversion: Theory, Evidence, and
State Policy Options, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1495, 1523 (1998); Ramesh K. Shukla, et al., A
Comparative Analysis of Revenue and Cost-Management Strategies of Not-for-Profit and For-Profit
Hospitals, 42 HOSP. & HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 117, 131 (1997).
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through their rating and underwriting practices. But appreciating the
impact of the nonprofit health care sector under the current legal regime
requires an examination of both nonquantifiable elements of the safety net
and the societal framework within which nonprofits operate. As Jill Horwitz
put it, besides “function[ing] as safety nets where government fails[,]
[nonprofit hospitals] provide avenues of civic participation that generate
social capital, and allow for the expression and promotion of diverse values
28
or world views that sustain democracy.” Additionally, economic studies
reveal the chameleon-like character of nonprofit organizations: Their
performance is strongly influenced by the degree to which they compete
with for-profit counterparts and by the regulatory and payment
environment in which they operate.
1. Hospitals
The economic literature concerning the nonprofit hospital sector is
vast and in some respects indeterminate. One cannot confidently conclude
that the nonprofit form does or does not “make a difference” in terms of
its net “payback” for tax exemption and other benefits it enjoys. At the
same time, a close examination of these studies reveals intriguing patterns
that can guide legal and policy analysis. Moreover, uncertainty about
performance of nonprofits is itself an important finding that should
inform doctrinal analysis.
29
30
To start with the bottom line, measures of price,
cost, profit
28. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 1350 (footnotes omitted).
29. Older studies pretty consistently showed that for-profits charged their patients
more. See, e.g., Marsteller et al., supra note 27, at 1503. One recent study, focusing
exclusively on Medicare data, found that in 1989, 1992, and 1995, “per capita Medicare
spending in areas served by for-profit hospitals was higher than in areas served by not-forprofit hospitals.” Elaine M. Silverman et al., The Association Between For-Profit Hospital
Ownership and Increased Medicare Spending, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 420, 424 (1999).
Specifically, the study found that spending growth increased after conversion to for-profit
status. Id. at 423. Many explanations are offered for why for-profits charge more, including
price gouging, greater costs, and the economic disadvantage of for-profits’ obligation to pay
taxes. Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Economics of For-Profit and Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 18 HEALTH AFF.
178, 183 (2000); see Shukla et al., supra note 27, at 129 (suggesting that only about thirty
percent of for-profits’ higher costs can be attributed to higher taxes). The most recent data
on hospital pricing is mixed, suggesting that pricing is more sensitive to market factors. See,
e.g., Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 2, at 71.
30. Older studies consistently showed for-profit expenses per day or admission to be
greater than nonprofits. See Marsteller et al., supra note 27, at 1506. One study using 1993
data from Virginia hospitals found that for-profits’ revenue margins were attributable to
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32

33

margin, efficiency, quality, and access give modest support to the claim

pricing strategies rather than cost savings: “[For-profit] hospitals charged 24.8 percent
more for outpatient procedures and 28 percent more for inpatient procedures.” Shukla et
al., supra note 27, at 128. For-profit hospitals’ administrative costs in 1994 averaged twentythree percent more than those of nonprofit hospitals, and thirty-four percent more than
those of public hospitals. Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Costs of Care and
Administration at For-Profit and Other Hospitals in the United States, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 769,
772 (1997). In 1994, both the per discharge and day in-patient costs were higher in forprofit than either not-for-profit or public hospitals, despite the lower wage and salary costs
in for-profit facilities. See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra, at 772. Cutler and Horwitz
have questioned the extent to which the accuracy of for-profit cost reports has been
affected by behavior such as that engaged in by Columbia/HCA, which consistently
overestimated costs to Medicare. Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 2, at 64.
31. For-profits unquestionably generate a healthier profit margin than other hospitals,
hovering around nine percent, while not-for-profit margins come in at around four percent
with public hospitals falling in slightly behind. Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Market
Forces, Diversification of Activity, and the Mission of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, in THE CHANGING
HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 198. But see James B. Rebitzer, Comments on Chapters 1
and 2, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 87 (citing data from Tennessee
that conversion did not improve profitability). Cutler and Horwitz suggest that one of the
primary reasons for-profits more successfully generate revenue is because they more
effectively game the loopholes in Medicare reimbursement. Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 2,
at 64. They further found, however, that nonprofits in the same market, after discovering
the billing practices of the for-profit, soon followed suit. Id.
32. In more competitive regions, for-profit hospitals increase investment in hotel, as
opposed to clinical services, presumably focusing on the aspects of care observable to
patients. By comparison, nonprofit investment in clinical services increases with increased
competition. DANA B. MUKAMEL ET AL., BMC HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH, HOSPITAL
COMPETITION, RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND QUALITY OF CARE 58 (2002),
http://www.pubmedcentral.gov/articlerender.fcgi?tool=pubmed&pubmedid=12052; PAUL
GERTLER & JENNIFER KUAN, ARE NONPROFITS EFFICIENT? A TEST USING HOSPITAL MARKET
VALUES (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 323922, 2002), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=323922. Nonprofit and government entities are perceived as
having no or diffuse owners, which results in weak governance with ill-defined, or at least
not wealth maximizing, goals. Id.
33. Studies from the 1990s suggest that nonprofits perform more favorably than for–
profits on many of the benchmarks of quality. One study focusing on quality of care in Utah
and Colorado hospitals, as measured by the occurrence of preventable adverse events,
found a lower frequency of these events at nonprofit hospitals as compared with for-profit
hospitals and minor teaching or non-teaching public hospitals. Eric J. Thomas et al.,
Hospital Ownership and Preventable Adverse Events, 15 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 211, 215 (2000). A
recent meta-analysis comparing mortality rates of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals
concluded that for-profits are “associated with a statistically significant increase in the risk of
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that nonprofit hospitals historically have returned benefits to society.
While some suggest that broader conceptions of “community benefit” (that
include charity care, bad debt, losses from community programs, teaching,
and research) yield convincing evidence that nonprofit hospitals
contribute significantly more benefits than the cost of their tax
34
exemption, others observe that for-profit hospitals’ “contribution” to
society is at least as great when one counts their tax payments as a
35
community benefit. Evidence further suggests that characteristics of the
local market, such as the presence of other hospitals, managed care
penetration, and socio-economic status of the community, are far more

death.” P.J. Devereaux et al., A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Studies Comparing
Mortality Rates of Private For-Profit and Private Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 166 CAN. MED. ASS’N J.
1399, 1402 (2002). The authors suggest that their results may underestimate the relative
rate of mortality in for-profit facilities because of a possibility that nonprofits serve patients
with greater disease severity, and that for-profits serve a greater proportion of private pay
patients. Id. at 1404. Further, even if not-for-profits do set the bar in a market for quality,
for-profits co-existing in the same market will be compelled to meet that bar, at least with
respect to aspects of quality that are measurable and marketable. However, more
sophisticated analysis suggests a more positive outcome for the for-profit entity:
On average, we find that for-profit hospitals have higher mortality among elderly
patients with heart disease, and that this difference has grown over the last
decade. However, much of the difference appears to be associated with the location of forprofit hospitals: When we compare hospital quality within specific markets, for-profit
ownership appears, if anything, to be associated with better quality care. Moreover, the
small average difference in mortality between for-profit and not-for-profit
hospitals masks an enormous amount of variation in mortality within each of
these ownership types. Overall, these results suggest that factors other than forprofit status per se may be the main determinants of quality of care in hospitals.
Mark McClellan & Douglas Staiger, Comparing Hospital Quality at For-Profit and Not-for-Profit
Hospitals, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY, supra note 2, at 93, 94-95 (emphasis added).
This outcome may be explained by the fact that higher quality hospitals tend to attract
more difficult cases. Id. at 96. McClellan and Staiger confirmed others’ findings that higher
volume hospitals tended to have lower mortality rates. Id. at 100. McClellan and Staiger
further hypothesize that for-profit hospitals might be attracted to markets with lower quality
care if low quality is a signal of poor management, making the hospital an attractive
takeover target. Id. at 110.
34. Gary Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions, 16 HEALTH AFF. 9, 18
(1997) (summarizing over twenty studies and concluding “the evidence indicates that there
is a substantial difference between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals in terms of the
[broadly defined] community benefits they provide.”).
35. See id. at 18; see also Jack Needleman, The Role of Nonprofits in Healthcare, 26 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 1113, 1122-130 (2001) (summarizing the literature comparing for-profit
and nonprofit hospitals).
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powerful predictors of performance than the nonprofit form. Nevertheless,
there can be little question that the nonprofit sector contributes to society
free care and other measurable community benefits. Whether these
benefits are less than or greater than the sum of societal expenditures (via
foregone taxes, volunteer labor and other sources) remains a hotly
36
disputed question.
This empirical record must be approached with caution, however.
Most importantly, the economic literature does not enable one to draw
conclusions about a “but for” world, i.e., one without nonprofit hospitals. A
number of studies have attempted to compare performance between forprofits and nonprofits, finding generally that for-profits provide
considerable charity care, perhaps approaching that of nonprofits, though
certainly not at the level provided by government hospitals or academic
37
medical centers. Notably, for the most part these studies do not account
for the dynamics that drive both sectors. Left unanswered are questions as
to whether for-profits would be more or less willing to offer charity care in
the absence of nonprofits in their markets, and whether nonprofits would
generally adopt more aggressive pricing policies in response to competitive
38
pressures of their counterparts. The few studies that do tackle the issue
39
depict a highly interactive relationship.
Furthermore, these studies cannot inform us about the potential of
nonprofit firms to fulfill their goals if legal and regulatory constraints were
removed. Indeed, across a number of characteristics and behavior,
nonprofit status does appear to have significance in ways highly relevant to
public policy analysis. Most importantly, ownership form correlates with
market entry and exit with product line. Studies show that for-profits tend
40
41
to locate in more affluent areas; are quicker to enter new markets; and

36. See Robert C. Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1417, 1434 (1980) (questioning whether nonprofits provide societal benefits commensurate
with the advantages offered to them).
37. Many nonprofit to for-profit conversion transactions involve contract provisions
requiring maintenance of current levels of charity care for a fixed period of time. Only time
will tell whether the expiration of these contract requirements will affect for-profits’
provision of uncompensated care.
38. Horwitz, supra note 5, at 1361-62.
39. See Cutler & Horwitz, supra note 2, at 71-73 (citing studies that depict the highly
interactive relationship); Horwitz, supra note 5, at 1361 (hypothesizing that “for-profit
hospitals often move first in markets and that not-for-profit and governmental hospitals
copy the behavior of for-profit hospitals.”).
40. H. Shelton Brown, Income, Location, and the Demand for Health Care from Public,
Nonprofit, and For-Profit Hospitals, 27 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 24, 24 (2001).
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more readily exit if the community experiences economic deterioration.
Growing evidence also suggests that for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals
diverge along product market dimensions, with not-for-profit hospitals
43
more likely to offer unprofitable services and less inclined to drop
44
services.
2. Nonprofit Health Plans
There is also a large literature analyzing differences between nonprofit
and for-profit health plans. Deriving generalized conclusions from these
studies is difficult because much depends on how one defines “community
benefits” and “health plans.” However, as a general matter, they illustrate
some significant differences between nonprofit and for-profit HMOs in the
extent to which they provide broadly-defined community benefits. As to
health insurers, there is little evidence that the nonprofit form makes a
positive difference for the communities in which they operate.
As with the hospital sector, the meaning of “community benefits” for
health plans lies in the eye of the beholder. Health insurers are not
providers of care and do not supply charity health services; in addition few
plans provide significant amounts of free insurance, though some subsidize
premiums for those who cannot afford to pay. Community rating, which
spreads risk broadly across populations, has largely disappeared as
competitive market pressures have caused nonprofit Blue Cross plans
(which were once required by regulation to community rate) to emulate
for-profit counterparts and adopt experience rating. More subtle
community benefits may be found in the underwriting and risk selection
practices of these organizations. That is, nonprofits may eschew practices
associated with favorable risk selection such as seeking to attract healthier
subscribers through underwriting or product design and marketing. Such
practices diminish the benefits of broad pooling of risk and thus deprive
the less healthy segments of society the implicit subsidy they receive from
healthier citizens. Even here, however, the picture is not one-sided: More
accurate risk underwriting increases the number of people who will be able
to afford health insurance. Finally, there are a host of other, somewhat
inchoate benefits that may be associated with nonprofit health plans. For
example, they may be more responsive to community needs, more active in

41.
42.
43.
44.

See HANSMANN ET AL., OWNERSHIP, supra note 4.
See Brown, supra note 40, at 36.
Horwitz, supra note 5, at 1364.
Id. at 1373.
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advocating public policies that serve the community, or more inclined to
provide coverage for services that have public goods characteristics such as
immunization and health education programs.
Studies of HMOs, which integrate insurance and delivery of health
care, provide fairly persuasive evidence of differences between for-profit
and nonprofit firms in the non-price dimensions of their services. One
important recent study comparing HMOs using fifty-three measures
representing eight distinctive dimensions of community impact reports
that nonprofits provide more community benefits than their for-profit
45
counterparts. It found statistically significant evidence that nonprofit
HMOs were more likely to provide subsidies for medical services, support
safety net health care agencies, target community benefit programs to low
46
income neighborhoods, and provide general philanthropy. In addition,
studies of consumer satisfaction and consumer evaluations of quality
47
generally, but not uniformly, reflect favorably on nonprofit HMOs. Such
findings may be the result of the public’s perception that the for-profit
HMO owners’ financial stake and ability to make a profit results in the
48
limiting of services to patients.
Turning from nonprofit HMOs to nonprofit companies primarily
engaged in selling health insurance and network packages such as Blue
Cross and Blue Shield plans (the Blues), there is far less evidence of
community benefit, however defined. For example, a large number of
studies examining health plans that converted from nonprofit to for-profit
status show that the conversion had little or no impact on customer service

45. See generally Mark Schlesinger et al., Measuring Community Benefits Provided by Nonprofit
and For-Profit HMOs, 40 INQUIRY 114 (2003).
46. Id. at 125.
47. Bruce E. Landon et al., Health Plan Characteristics and Consumers’ Assessments of
Quality: For the First Time, the Characteristics of Health Plans Are Linked with Consumer Feedback in
a Nationwide Survey, 20 HEALTH AFF. 274, 281 (2001); see also Mark A. Hall & Christopher J.
Conover, The Impact of Blue Cross Conversions on Accessibility, Affordability, and the Public Interest,
81 MILBANK Q. 509, 520 (2003) (summarizing studies and concluding that “although the
evidence is mixed, it suggests that members of nonprofit HMOs are more satisfied and
receive better service and a somewhat higher quality of care”); Robert Kuttner, Must Good
HMOs Good Bad?, 21 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1558, 1562 (1998) (“[N]onprofit [health] plans as a
group tend to score better on many objective indicators and in surveys of consumers.”).
48. See Bradford H. Gray, Conversion of HMOs and Hospitals: What’s At Stake?; The Pros and
Cons of Nonprofit Conversions Through the Lens of Public Policy, 16 HEALTH AFF. 29, 40 (1997).
Another important qualification of statistical comparisons between for profit and nonprofit
HMOs is that they may not adjust adequately to reflect significant differences in the
populations they serve. See Hall & Conover, supra note 47, at 520.
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or consumer satisfaction; evidence regarding recent Blue Cross Plans
which have converted show that customer satisfaction scores have actually
49
increased post-conversion. Conversion studies also examine relative
profitability, pricing, and access: Here too there is no persuasive evidence
that nonprofits offer significant benefits. While it is clear that moving from
not-for-profit to for-profit status impels organizations to generate more
50
profits, the change neither generates significant gains in efficiency nor
51
improvements in terms of the firm’s overall financial condition.
Although some claim that for-profit health plans in general engage in
52
aggressive risk selection in underwriting practices, the evidence on this
53
score is at best mixed.
Of course when one addresses the conversion issue from a policy
standpoint, it is necessary to consider offsetting benefits that may accrue.
Weighing in favor of conversions are factors such as enhanced efficiency
and lower costs resulting from more aggressive negotiating with providers
54
and tax payments that will flow to the public sector. Finally, and perhaps
most important is putting resources to their best use. As Hall and Conover
put it, “The largest potential benefit [of conversions of nonprofit plans] is
to unlock considerable wealth that can be devoted to explicitly health
55
related charitable purposes.”

49. Hall & Conover, supra note 47, at 531 (noting that Blue Cross plans in California
have improved customer satisfaction scores).
50. Hall & Conover, supra note 47, at 515.
51. See Robert Cunningham & Douglas Sherlock, Bounceback: Blues Thrive as Markets Cool
Toward HMOs, 21 HEALTH AFF. 24, 30 (2002) (noting that while all Blue Cross plans have
become more profitable in recent years, the for-profit Blue Cross plans may have been
profitable even if they had remained nonprofit).
52. See Kuttner, supra note 47, at 1561 (“[E]ntrepreneurial commercial HMOs . . . tend
to engage in more aggressive risk selection, use more stringent systems of approval and
denial of care, and put a higher fraction of the physicians’ income at risk.”).
53. Hall & Conover, supra note 47, at 530 (studies indicate that “the time has passed
when [Blue Cross] plans were much more lenient underwriters than other insurers, and
underwriting practices and policies at nonprofit [Blue Cross] plans are now broadly
consistent with those of for-profit insurers.”). Interviews conducted by Hall and Conover
with a broad array of individuals familiar with the effects of Blue Cross conversions in their
states indicate divergent outcomes. In some states, interviewees thought that the
underwriting practices of the converted Blues were similar in comparison to other insurers,
if not more lenient. However, respondents in California and Missouri thought that
conversion had adversely impacted the risk selection in these states. Id. at 530-31.
54. See id. at 521-23, 532-33.
55. Id. at 538.
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This generalized description of the nonprofit health care sector
provides background for evaluating legal doctrine in specific contexts. It
suggests that theoretical accounts purporting to explain the persistence of
the nonprofit sector do not provide a convincing argument that it will
automatically supply desired public benefits. While the empirical literature
confirms that the sector has not fulfilled society’s goals, our interpretation
of this evidence views the glass as half full. We find ample reason to believe
that, properly incentivized, nonprofits could supply public goods efficiently
and creatively. We turn next to explaining why the legal regime does not
satisfy the conditions necessary to promote the sector achieving its goals.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
The 1990s witnessed a sharp increase in the number of cases involving
breaches of fiduciary duties by directors and officers of nonprofit
corporations that have prompted aggressive review by state attorneys
56
general. We identify in subsequent Sections of this Article two central
flaws in the law regulating nonprofit governance: an insufficiently stringent
standard of conduct for directors, which has countenanced neglect and
abuse, and a failure to afford directors leeway to take into account the
charitable mission in their business decisions. As a prelude to our doctrinal
analysis and recommendations, this Part presents a handful of prototypical
cases that illustrate these problems.
In the view of many academic commentators, the experience of recent
years in the nonprofit sector involving well-publicized directorial conflicts
of interest and lax oversight confirm theoretical claims that fiduciary
standards are set “too low” and inadequately constrain the behavior of
57
nonprofit management tempted by opportunities for abuse. While it is
58
hazardous to generalize from a few episodes of abuse, the “too low”

56. See Aramony v. United Way, 949 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y 1996); Adelphi Univ. v. Bd.
of Regents, 647 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1996); In re Found. for New Era Philanthropy Litig., 175
F.R.D. 202 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Honolulu Star Bulletin, Kamehameha Schools/Bishop Estate
Archives, http://starbulletin.com/specials/bishop1997.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2004). See
generally MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH & ANDRAS KOSARAS, WRONGDOING BY OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS OF CHARITIES: A SURVEY OF PRESS REPORTS 1995-2002 (Hauser Center for
Nonprofit Organizations, Working Paper No. 20, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=451240
(identifying 104 criminal cases and fifty-four breach of duty cases, the majority of which
involved human service agencies).
57. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes,
Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 631, 642 (1998).
58. See, e.g., Sasso, supra note 20, at 1519 (“[E]xtrapolating from a few outrageous
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hypothesis merits close attention and has received implicit endorsement
from legislative actions targeting directorial oversight abuses though
59
60
federal tax, Sarbanes-Oxley, House of Representative hearings on the tax
61
exempt status of hospitals, Senate Finance Committee oversight hearings
62
regarding nonprofit governance, state laws targeting governance in
63
specific circumstances and regulatory actions taken by the Internal
64
65
Revenue Service and national exchange regulators. The second
scandals to conclude that there is a pervasive problem plaguing the entire not-for-profit
industry is a misguided leap in logic.”).
59. A significant recent change in federal tax policy targeting self-dealing abuses was
the enactment of an excise tax penalizing so-called excess benefit transactions. 26 U.S.C. §
4958 (2000).
60. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). While not directly altering fiduciary
obligations, Sarbanes-Oxley contains a number of provisions that affect the conduct of
fiduciaries and composition of important committees. For example, section 301 requires
that audit committee members be independent; section 402 forbids personal loans to
directors and executive officers; and section 407 mandates rules requiring public
companies to disclose whether the audit committee is comprised of at least one member
who is a financial expert. Id. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The SarbanesOxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149 (2004).
61. See First Hearing in a Series on Tax Exemption: Pricing Practices of Hospitals Before the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, Subcomm. on Oversight, 108th Cong. (2004).
62. In June 2004, the Senate Finance Committee held hearings concerning a variety of
abuses and failures of governance in charitable organizations. Charity Oversight and Reform:
Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Charities: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Fin., 108th
Cong. (2004). The committee also issued a white paper, STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FIN.,
108TH
CONG.,
STAFF
DISCUSSION
DRAFT,
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf, outlining possible reforms, many of which deal with
the mechanisms of accountability in nonprofit organizations. Among the proposals
contained in the white paper are limitations on the size of boards of directors, specific
standards for fulfilling fiduciary duties, improved disclosures of financial matters, standards
and enhanced penalties for self dealing, and a required five-year review of exempt status of
all exempt organizations by the IRS. Id.
63. See, e.g., MODEL ACT FOR NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE CONVERSIONS (1998), reprinted in
THOMAS L. GREANEY & ROBERT SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: SELECTED STATUTES AND
REGULATIONS 300 (2003).
64. Responding to widespread concerns that charities were awarding excessive
compensation and benefits to officers and insiders, the IRS recently announced a new
enforcement effort that will examine levels of compensation, insider loans, and the
exchange and sale of property to officers and others. Kurt Ritterpusch, IRS Launches
Enforcement Effort Targeting Compensation in Tax-Exempt Organizations, 13 BNA HEALTH L. REP.
1183, 1183 (2004). The heightened attention to compensation issues appears to have been
prompted in part by Congressional oversight hearings concerning nonprofit organizational
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important challenge inadequately met by state law governing fiduciaries is
the need to ensure nonprofit agents’ fidelity to their institutions’
charitable purposes. State law is curiously silent on how mission—the
central precept guiding the nonprofit charity—should inform directors’
interpretations of their responsibilities under nonprofit corporate law.
Wielding considerable leverage over nonprofit boards, some attorneys
general have through their enforcement actions implicitly assumed de
facto powers over a broad spectrum of business decisions and health
policies.
A. Attorneys General’s Attempts To Police Conflicts of Interest and Laxity
The widespread conversions to for-profit status by nonprofit health
66
plans and hospitals in the nineties served as a wake-up call to attorneys
general, most of whom had not previously actively monitored that sector.
These transactions, which in many cases the attorney general learned of
after the fact, gave rise to numerous allegations of breaches of fiduciary
duties by directors and officers. In some instances, overt conflicts of
67
interest were present in which insiders took jobs or ownership interests in
the for-profit acquirer with which they had negotiated sales on favorable
68
69
terms. In Butterworth v. Anclote Manor Hospital, for example, Florida’s

governance. Id. (“The closer we look at charities in our Finance Committee, the stronger
the case gets for meaningful legislative reforms that shut down exorbitant pay for charity
executives and sweetheart deals for insiders . . . .”) (quoting Senator Grassley).
65. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-48745, 68 Fed. Reg.
64154 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving NYSE and NASDAQ self governance regulations).
66. See James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the
Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 701,
702 (1998) (describing the conversion phenomenon of the 1990s as “the largest
redeployment of charitable assets in the Anglo-American world since Henry VII [sic] closed
the monasteries in 1536-1540”). See generally Eleanor Hamburger et al., The Pot of Gold:
Monitoring Health Care Conversions Can Yield Billions of Dollars for Health Care, 29
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 473 (1995).
67. See Andrea Gerlin, Hospital in Florida Is Focus of Probes Tied to Scuttled Bid by
Columbia/HCA, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1995, at B10 (reporting allegations that the president of
a Florida hospital who intentionally devalued the hospital in an attempt to sell it at an
attractive price to a proprietary chain subsequently took a management position with that
chain after being terminated by the hospital).
68. For example, when Health Net, a nonprofit HMO, converted to for-profit form,
thirty-three executives were able to purchase twenty percent of the stock of the new entity
for $1.5 million; four years later those shares were worth approximately $315 million.
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Attorney General challenged the conversion of a nonprofit hospital whose
assets were purchased by a for-profit, the sole shareholders of which were
the directors and corporate members of the nonprofit. The assets were
purchased for $6.3 million; two years later, the converted, for-profit
70
hospital was sold for more than $29 million.
While conversions and closures of health systems fueled concerns
71
among attorneys general about managerial abuse, the rapid vertical
integration occurring throughout the health care sector also gives rise to
instances of self-dealing and lax directorial supervision. The collapse of the
Allegheny Health, Education, and Research Foundation (AHERF) in the
nation’s largest nonprofit health care bankruptcy case provides the
paradigm example of unsupervised management excess. Under the
leadership of its Chief Executive Officer, Sherif Abdelhak, AHERF grew
rapidly, borrowed heavily, and collapsed precipitously. As several careful
studies of AHERF business operations reveal, the over-arching problem was
72
the structure and performance of its corporate governance system. Over

Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: State and Federal Responses to Hospitals’
Changes in Charitable Status, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221, 231 n.52 (1997).
69. 566 So. 2d 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see also Fair Care Found. v. D.C. Dep’t of
Ins. & Secs. Regulation, 716 A.2d 987 (D.C. 1998) (rejecting claims that the board’s
decision was infected by conflicts of interest and issues going to members integrity).
70. Butterworth, 566 So. 2d at 297.
71. In an interesting twist, in October 2003 the Santa Paula, California City Council
voted to ask the California Attorney General to compel a local nonprofit hospital to
complete a merger deal with the public health care system, which, the board claimed,
offered a better chance than the nonprofit alternative to save the cash strapped rural
facility. Laura B. Benko, California Attorney General Asked to Force Merger Meant to Save Hospital,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 27, 2003, at 14. The City Council alleged that the nonprofit board
has been dilatory in taking the necessary actions to save the hospital, in violation of the state
code governing nonprofit facilities. Amanda Covarrubias, Hospital Merger May Get a Nudge,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at B1. Santa Paula ended up closing and declaring bankruptcy.
Lynne Barnes, Clinics To Extend Medical Services, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at B3.
72. The complex AHERF organization was governed by a parent board consisting of no
fewer than thirty-five members. Ten other boards, having little overlapping membership,
governed fifty-five corporations; each board was generally unaware of what other parts of
the system were doing. Directors were chosen and dominated by Mr. Abdelhak and board
meetings were, according to one analysis, “scripted affairs, intentionally staged to limit
oversight and participation by board members . . . . [M]embers . . . receive as many as 1,000
pages of paper to be discussed at board meetings. . . . As one former member explained,
‘Half of the people didn’t even open the book. They didn’t have the time.’” Lawton R.
Burns et al., The Fall of the House of AHERF: The Allegheny Bankruptcy, 19 HEALTH AFF. 7, 21
(2000). Although the AHERF boards consisted of top-notch executives, all were extremely
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sixty lawsuits were filed after AHERF’s collapse, most alleging breaches of
73
the duty of care and duty of loyalty by directors. The Pennsylvania
Attorney General’s prosecution and resulting recovery stressed the role of
nonprofit directors in safeguarding assets and their legal responsibilities
when oversight is lacking. The ultimate AHERF settlement resulted in a
74
distribution of $93.7 million. Criminal prosecution also resulted in
75
confinement for Mr. Abdelhak.
B. Attorneys General’s Attempts To Regulate Mission
As we discuss in Part III, the law is virtually silent on the question of
when, why, and how a charitable corporation may alter its purpose or
76
redeploy its assets to fulfill a re-envisioned sense of its mission. This
Section samples a few instances in which attorneys general have challenged
nonprofit boards’ strategic plans. Several have used mission-protective
concepts from charitable trust law or invoked corporate fiduciary
principles to enjoin the board’s execution of its plans or to replace board
members. Other attorneys general have used similar legal arguments in
attempts to bar movement of charitable assets out of state.
1. Whose Mission?
Frequently, challenges made by attorneys general to actions by

busy and unable to perform a broad oversight responsibility over the organization. In
addition, the bylaws permitted many key decisions to be made by Mr. Abdelhak. Id.
73. See infra Subsection II.A.2.
74. The settlement “represent[ed] payments of $48 million from the insurers, $28.5
million from Mellon Bank, $1 million from Allegheny General Hospital and $7.75 million
from funds held by bankruptcy trustees.” FREMONT-SMITH & KOSARAS, supra note 56, at 20
(citing the settlement agreement at http://www.attorneygeneral.gov/ppd/PDF/
AHERF_Settlement_Agreement.pdf). “More than $49 million of the total was paid to
creditors, $22 million was paid to the Attorney General for distribution to the surviving
charitable foundation, $13 million was paid for legal fees, and $4.5 million was paid to settle
a class action lawsuit doctors brought against the Foundation.” Id. at 20.
75. The AHERF CEO was sentenced to eleven and a half months but served three and a
half months. See Cinda Becker, Early Release: Abdelhak Wins Parole after Serving Three Months,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 3, 2003, at 18; Editorial, AHERF Whimper, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE,
Sept.
8,
2002,
available
at
http://www.post-gazette.com/forum/
20020908edsharif0908p1.asp; Anatomy of a Bankruptcy (pts. 1-6), PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Jan. 17-24, 1999, collected at http://www.postgazette.com/aherf/.
76. Evelyn Brody calls this the “front-end cy pres issue.” Brody, Whose Public?, supra note
13, at 962.
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nonprofit boards implicate the organization’s mission. These cases typically
arise in the context of disputes over attempts by boards to change the
corporate purpose or to undertake “organic” changes, e.g. mergers, joint
ventures, conversions, and closures that ultimately impact the institution’s
mission. Underlying these legal disputes is an issue going to the heart of
the nonprofit governance debate: Who ultimately controls a charitable
corporation’s mission?
Two New York cases illustrate the uncertainty attending judicial (or
prosecutorial) attempts to monitor mission fidelity under the current state
of the law. First, Littauer v. Spitzer involved a merger, driven by financial
exigencies, between a secular and a Catholic hospital, each of which were
controlled by parents; the merger was accomplished by transferring
control of both hospitals to a common parent, which itself became a joint
77
subsidiary of the original parents. A major point of contention was the
hospitals’ agreement that the Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives
would apply to all corporate entities, thereby eliminating access to certain
reproductive health services that had previously been provided by the
78
secular hospital. Positing that the transaction essentially constituted a
change in the purposes and ownership of the two facilities, the Attorney
General contended that his approval was required under New York’s
nonprofit statute. An appellate court concluded that the state’s nonprofit
law was not implicated and that the attorney general had no role in
approving the transaction. In reaching this result, it held that a change in
corporate membership of the respective hospital corporations neither
79
added, eliminated, or changed a corporate purpose or power nor
constituted the “functional equivalent of a sale, lease, exchange or other
80
disposition of corporate assets.” Responding to the concerns expressed
about the elimination of reproductive health services, the court in Littauer
distinguished between a change to a corporate power and a change to
services, holding that the latter falls squarely within the business discretion
of the board of directors and should not be subject to judicial second77. Littauer Hosp. Assoc. v. Spitzer, 287 A.D.2d 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); see also
Robert P. Borsody, The Parent-Subsidiary Structure in Not-For-Profit Hospital Transfers, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 2, 2004, at 4.
78. Before proceeding, the parties secured a Department of Health ruling that no
regulatory approval of the transaction was required. The State Department of Health
declines oversight of nonprofit hospital affiliations under a “passive parent rule.” William
Josephson, Charities Law: Guidance for Practitioners and Fiduciaries, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 10, 2003, at 4
n.9.
79. 287 A.D.2d at 204-06.
80. Id. at 207.
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guessing.
The Littauer decision stands in marked contrast to the decision two
years earlier of another New York court in the Manhattan Eye, Ear and
Throat Hospital (MEETH) case that had suggested much broader attorney
82
general authority over nonprofit board decision-making. MEETH, a
fixture on the upper-east side of Manhattan for almost a century, is a
world-renowned, acute care specialty hospital in ophthalmology,
83
otolaryngology, and plastic surgery. In the face of continuing declines in
operating revenues resulting from reductions in third party
reimbursements and a general shift from in-patient to out-patient
admissions, the board decided that its mission would be best actualized by
“monetizing” MEETH’s principal asset—real estate—and investing the
proceeds in free-standing diagnostic and treatment centers in underserved
84
areas of the city. The court characterized MEETH’s strategy as
abandoning the “acute care, teaching and research hospital component of
85
its mission,” and analogized it to a conversion. Because the hospital sale
constituted a fundamental change to its business purposes, the court
concluded, that the attorney general did indeed have standing to review
the transaction. “While it is certainly correct that the definition of
‘hospital’ . . . includes a diagnostic and treatment center, as MEETH now
argues, it is sophistry to contend that this means that MEETH is not
86
seeking a new and fundamentally different purpose.” Thus, in contrast to
Littauer, the court performed its own “de novo” analysis of the nonprofit’s
mission and reached a conclusion that virtually ignored the board’s
assessment of how to respond to a significantly changed financial
environment while remaining true to its original mission.
The elusive legal status of mission is also illustrated in cases involving
integrated delivery systems which bring multiple actors in the health care
system under one corporate parent, sometimes including both providers
87
and payors. The unique invocation of mission principles by the
81. Id. at 206-07.
82. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 592-93 (Sup. Ct.
1999).
83. Id. at 577.
84. Id. at 577-79.
85. Id. at 594-95. “[I]n both there is a charitable organization which alleges that it is
incapable of continuing its primary mission of operating a hospital, seeks approval of the
sale of all its assets, and plans to apply the sale proceeds towards a newly revised mission.”
Id.
86. Id. at 595.
87. These integrated delivery systems are generally formed precisely for the purpose of
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Minnesota Attorney General in his investigation of the Allina Health
88
System suggests the protean nature of the doctrine as currently applied.
Allina’s multi-corporate structure included entities that provided health
89
services and health insurance. Although this organizational structure is
quite common, the Minnesota Attorney General took the position that the
structure is impermissible because it is impossible for related organizations
90
to pursue the missions of- both its nonprofit HMO and its hospitals. He
claimed that the HMO’s mission—to manage health costs and control
premiums—conflicted with the hospitals’ “different,” “broader,” and
91
“sometimes conflicting” mission “to act as caregivers to patients.”
Following extensive and sometimes bitter negotiations, Allina agreed to

capitalizing on the benefits that can be achieved from horizontal and vertical integration.
Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and Antitrust, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1516 (1994).
88. See MINN. ATT’Y GEN., MEDICA: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST WITH ALLINA 7-11,
http://www.ag.state.mn.us./consumer/PDF/Allina/Allina_Medica.PDF (last visited Mar.
17, 2004).
89. Health Systems and Medica Health Plans had interlocking directorates—seven
Allina board members served as Medica directors. Id. at 3.
90. Allina Health System entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that
required Allina to spin-off its HMO affiliate, Medica Health Plans, and adopt a variety of
new policies dealing with problems arising out of conflicts of interest, expense
reimbursement, executive compensation, third party contracting, and other matters. See
Memorandum of Understanding Between Allina Health System and Attorney General of
Minnesota, http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PDF/allina/MemUnder.pdf (last visited
Mar. 18, 2003).
91. The report accompanying the memorandum of understanding between the state
and Allina, MIN. ATT’Y GEN. OFFICE, ALLINA HEALTH SYSTEM REPORTS, collected at
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PR/pr_allina_mou_92401.htm (last visited Nov. 12,
2004), enumerated several instances of Medica board decisions that benefited the Allina
Health System—by favoring other Allina entities—to the potential detriment of Medica. For
example, Medica resolved to undertake a number of changes designed to reduce the
unfavorable sector of its Medicare risk pool. Medica reported its plan to Allina Health
System, which then studied the profitability of seniors to its hospitals. After Allina
concluded that the Medicare population was an important revenue base for its hospitals,
Medica reversed course, rejected its conclusions of a year prior, and re-entered the senior
Medicare managed care market. This led the Attorney General to conclude:
While it would serve Medica’s interest to charge a fee that included a profit for
such services, it generally operates the PPO function as a ‘channeling’ vehicle for
Allina. Medica basically charges health plans and TPAs a fee less than
competitors for PPO work in order to build up patient volume for Allina.
Id.
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spin the HMO off from its integrated delivery system. The outcome was
more than a bit startling. Neither before nor after this case have
commentators or policy experts seriously entertained the thought that
common ownership of providers and insurance subsidiaries gave rise to a
disabling conflict of interest. Perhaps equally notable was the Attorney
General’s ability to assert direct control over the nonprofit plan. The
settlement agreement empowered Attorney General Hatch to appoint
92
eight “special administrators,” itself creating something of a conflict of
interest since the new fiduciaries appointed by the Attorney General were
also subject to his supervision.
2. Whose Money?
Recent interventions by attorneys general and state insurance
regulators in multi-state transactions reveal what Evelyn Brody has aptly
characterized a growing “parochialism” that often seems more related to
93
political ends than public policy goals. As noted above, conversions of
not-for-profit to for-profit hospitals and health plans resulted in the
disappearance of millions of dollars in charitable assets due to
94
undervaluation, laxity, and in some cases, management self dealing.
Attorneys general and state legislatures finally reacted to ensure that
boards were making conversion decisions in the interests of the
95
corporation rather than themselves, that the assets of the corporation

92. See Stephanie Strom, Strong-Arm Shaking of Charities Raises Ethics Qualms, N.Y. TIMES,
May 11, 2003; see also Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 1007. Perhaps not
coincidentally, Minnesota Blue Cross and Blue Shield decided in 2003 to get out of the
hospital business, selling its Fargo hospital to a Catholic health care system. Patrick Reilly,
Back to Basics; Minn. Blues To Abandon Hospital Ownership, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 15, 2003,
at 12.
93. Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13.
94. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text; see also John F. Coverdale, Preventing
Insider Misappropriation of Not-For-Profit Health Care Provider Assets: A Federal Tax Law
Prescription, 73 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1998) (describing conversions and attendant abuses);
Shelley A. Sackett, Conversion of Not-for-Profit Health Care Providers: A Proposal for Federal
Guidelines on Mandated Charitable Foundations, 10 STAN. L. POL’Y REV. 247, 250 (1999)
(describing how and why the 1990s saw so many health care conversions); James D.
Standish, Hospital Conversion Revenue: A Critical Analysis of Present Law and Future Proposals To
Reform the Manner in Which Revenue Generated from Hospital Conversions Is Employed, 15 J.
CONTEMP. H EALTH L. & POL’Y 131 (1998) (explaining the impetus for so many conversions).
95. See Sackett, supra note 94, at 252-53, 254-55 (surveying successful enactment of state
legislation governing conversions).
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96

were being appropriately valued, and that the proceeds resulting from the
97
conversions were being dedicated to suitable ends. In what may at first
blush appear to be a natural extension of these concerns, attorneys general
have sought vigorously to capture the proceeds of transactions involving
nonprofit health care enterprises. As we shall see, however, there are serious
reasons to question the doctrinal and policy foundations for these
enforcement actions.
i. Banner
A common reason that nonprofit health care systems have been
disposing of some of their health care facilities only to turn around and
pick up new ones is regionalization. Systems whose holdings were scattered
across disparate states have been attempting to consolidate in fewer
contiguous states where resources can be more effectively (and more
98
profitably) deployed. In 2001, Banner Health System, a nonprofit
corporation based in Arizona, began doing precisely this—funding
expansions in Arizona and Colorado with the proceeds from sales of ten of
its twenty-seven hospitals and seventeen long-term-care facilities in seven
99
other states. Concerned about the exodus of charitable assets from their
states resulting from these sales, the attorneys general of North Dakota,
100
South Dakota, and New Mexico attempted to prevent Banner from
removing the proceeds from the facilities within the borders of their
101
respective states. The attorneys general posited that because the facilities
96. See John Colombo, A Proposal for an Exit Tax on Non-Profit Conversion Transactions, 23
IOWA J. CORP. L. 779, 785-86 (1998) (describing “horror stories” of excessive enrichment
and undervaluation); Sackett, supra note 94, at 250-51 (describing pre-regulatory
intervention valuation abuses); Standish, supra note 94, at 136, 138-40 (describing how
under-valuation was accomplished).
97. See Standish, supra note 94, at 144-64 (categorizing the different approaches states
have taken in legislating post-conversion foundations).
98. Since 1998, the large mergers emblematic of the preceding decade have fallen off.
Most mergers and acquisitions in 2002 involved community hospitals acquiring nearby
facilities, so that they could expand their local market. Patrick Reilly, Mergers Minus the
Mania, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 20, 2003, at 36.
99. Patrick Reilly, Trust Challenged: AHA Considers Involvement in Charitable Trust Fight,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 21, 2003, at 6.
100. Banner’s sale of its forty-seven bed New Mexico facility to Province Healthcare Co.,
a Tennessee-based for-profit company, prompted that state’s attorney general to threaten a
lawsuit for breach of trust; Banner paid a $4 million settlement to New Mexico. Id.
101. Barbara Gorham, Opinions/Commentary, Banner’s End Run Must End: Company
Plays Chess with Assets It Inherited While Communities Pay the Price, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Mar. 3,
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had benefited from the support of their local communities, which
enhanced the value of each entity’s assets, Banner would be unjustly
102
enriched if allowed to transfer those assets out of state.
On notice of the South Dakota Attorney General’s plans, Banner
103
Health System filed a declaratory judgment action to preclude the
Attorney General from imposing a constructive charitable trust on
104
Banner’s South Dakota facilities. Although nonprofit corporate law
would plainly permit sales and transfers within a multicorporate structure,
the South Dakota State Supreme Court was unpersuaded by Banner’s
argument that the state’s nonprofit corporate statute exclusively controlled
the transaction. Rather, it held that in enacting the state’s nonprofit
corporate law, “there is nothing in the code to indicate that the Legislature
intended to abrogate common law and statutory trust provisions with
105
regard to nonprofit corporations.” And even though Banner was not

2003, at 21.
102. Patrick Coffey et al., The “Charitable Trust” Controversy Confronting Banner Health and
Other Nonprofit Healthcare Systems, 16 HEALTH L. 1, 3 (2003). Banner’s consolidation resulted
in several settlements and court decisions. A trial court in North Dakota dismissed the
Attorney General’s complaint against Banner, concluding that community donations to
local hospitals do not satisfy the elements of a constructive trust; the court also rejected the
unjust enrichment argument. Id. Banner and the North Dakota Attorney General
eventually settled their differences when Banner agreed to a $1 million payment to the
state. State Roundup, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Dec. 16, 2003. Banner settled with New Mexico
for $8.5 million, which would be paid to charities dedicated to health care selected by the
Attorney General. Briefly: Hospital Deals, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23, 2003, at 10; New Mexico:
Banner Health Systems, State AG Settle on Sale of Medical Center to For-Profit Firm, 11 BNA HEALTH
L. REP. 831 (2002).
103. Banner was attempting to sell its hospital to Catholic Health Initiatives, a Denverbased nonprofit health care system, and its nursing home to Sisters of Mary of the
Presentation Health System. Banner Health Sys. v. Stenehjem, No. A3-02-121, 2003 WL
501821 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25, 2003).
104. The history of the several facilities, each of which changed hands several times, is
detailed in the state Supreme Court decision. Although certain donations to at least a
couple of the facilities clearly created trusts (e.g., The Dorsett Home), the facilities were
established or supported by a combination of unrestricted donations, fundraisers, and
government support. Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 245-46 (S.D. 2003).
105. Id. at 247. The court specifically sought to preserve the relevance of the following
statutory language preserving a court’s ability to employ the implied trust device when
equity so requires:
The enumeration in §§ 55-1-7 to 55-1-10, inclusive, of cases wherein an implied
trust arises does not exclude or prevent the arising of an implied trust in other
cases nor prevent a court of equity from establishing and declaring an implied,

27

1 ART_BOOZANG

12/23/2004 4:30 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

V:1 (2005)

obligated under any express trust, the court remanded the case on the
theory that an “implied trust” might be applied as a remedial construct to
preserve the status quo when “a person owning title to property is under an
equitable duty to convey it to another because he would be unjustly
106
enriched if he were permitted to retain it.” If other states adopt this
rather freewheeling approach, nonprofit corporations could find their
business plans completely thwarted by the imposition of trust-based
responsibilities that have little grounding in trust doctrine.
ii. Health Midwest
Another prominent case involving claims of trust-based duties arose
from the $1.125 billion acquisition of nonprofit Health Midwest hospital
system by the for-profit corporation HCA, Inc. This transaction provoked a
renewed Missouri-Kansas “border war,” pitting the Attorney General of
Missouri against the Attorney General of Kansas in a dispute over the
legality of the transaction and, more importantly, where the charitable
proceeds would land. Although similar to Banner, in that it involved an
attorney general asserting charitable trust law to extract concessions from
the nonprofit entity, the contention met with less success.
Health Midwest was a Kansas City-based integrated delivery system
whose various constituent corporations straddled the borders of Kansas
and Missouri. After initially threatening to dissolve Health Midwest and
remove its board, the Missouri Attorney General settled its side of the case
for an agreement that would create a conversion foundation (whose
directors would be chosen by the Missouri Attorney General) and which
would devote a minimum of ten percent of the conversion proceeds for

resulting, or constructive trust in other cases and instances pursuant to the
custom and practice of such courts.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-11 (Michie 2004).
106. Long, 663 N.W.2d at 247 (quoting Knock v. Knock, 120 N.W.2d 572 (S.D. 1963)).
The court left open the possibility that an implied trust might be appropriately imposed if
the Attorney General could establish that Banner had engaged in behavior which created
unjust enrichment, constituted a breach of fiduciary duties, or improperly amended
Banner’s articles of incorporation. Id. at 248-49. Further, if Banner was in a fiduciary
relationship with the communities in which its facilities were located, pursuant either to
trust law or the general common law governing fiduciary relationships, Banner may have
breached its duties as a fiduciary if, as alleged by the Attorney General, its actions were
premised on the best interests of Banner, rather than the local communities, who are the
beneficiaries of the relationship. Id. at 249.
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the benefit of Kansas. Kansas, finding itself on the short end of the
distribution of sales proceeds (Health Midwest’s internal estimate placed
Kansas’ share of assets at twenty percent), unleashed arguments grounded
in charitable trust and corporate law to oust the board members who had
approved the transaction with HCA and settled with the Missouri Attorney
General. Fanning the flames, the Kansas legislature attempted to intercede
108
as well.
Relying on charitable trust theory, the Kansas Attorney General asked
for a judicial cy pres proceeding, removal of Health Midwest’s directors and
the appointment of a fifteen person board (appointed by her) to run the
109
resulting charitable foundation. The court rejected almost all of the
Kansas claims, squarely holding that the corporate standard, not the
charitable trust standard, governed decision-making in nonprofit
110
corporations. Further, contrary to the Attorney General’s assertions, the

107. Health Midwest v. Kline, No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at *16-17 (D. Kan. Feb.
6, 2003).
108. Literally days before the Health Midwest trial began, the Kansas legislature enacted
a bill, designed to apply to Health Midwest’s Kansas’ assets, which requires a Kansas
nonprofit corporation to forfeit its assets to a foundation rather than to any third party. In
the course of declaring the statute unconstitutional, id. at *24, the court criticized the
state’s charitable trust theories as unsupported by Kansas law. Finally, the court observed
that the state’s compulsion that all charitable assets remain within Kansas’ borders could
result in the withdrawal from charitable activity any enterprise, foreign or domestic, seeking
to protect its assets from seizure by the state. Id.
109. The Attorney General claimed that the board was influenced by overly generous
compensation packages, failed to exercise due diligence, and failed to exercise reasonable
business judgment as to price, process, and use of proceeds in approving their mergers into
Health Midwest. See Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 1008-17 (summarizing the
pleadings in the Health Midwest litigation).
110. The Kansas District Court held that application of the charitable trust doctrine in cy
pres proceedings applied only to changes in restricted gifts and refused to apply it to
changes to a corporation’s purposes. The Kansas court explained:
The Kansas cy pres statute governs changes to the purposes of charitable trusts,
devises and bequests. The cy pres statute does not apply to changes to the
purposes of nonprofit corporations. The cy pres statute applies only to any
restricted gifts and not the entity as a whole. No restricted gifts have been
identified herein and therefore the cy pres statute does not apply.
Health Midwest, 2003 WL 328845, at *19 (citation omitted). The court further rejected the
Attorney General’s attempt to assert the business judgment rule where there was simply a
“disagreement over contract terms, id. at *18, and reasoned that “a court can not second
guess the wisdom of facially valid decisions” of the board of a charitable corporation, id. at
*17.
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court held that cy pres does not apply to changes to purposes of charitable
111
corporations. In sum, the court believed that it was required to uphold
112
the Health Midwest board’s decision “unless the directors are guilty of
‘willful abuse of their discretionary power or of bad faith, neglect of duty,
perversion of corporate purpose, or when fraud or breach of trust are
113
involved.’” At the same time the Kansas Court found that under
nonprofit corporate law, mission obligations should have compelled the
Health Midwest directors to strike a better balance for Kansas: It found
that the proposed post-merger Missouri foundation would have insufficient
“Kansas participation in its governance” and that the plan offered
“nebulous spending commitments to benefit the citizens of Kansas in
114
Health Midwest’s Kansas service area.”
iii. CareFirst
Finally, some organic changes by nonprofit third party payors have
encountered objections from insurance commissioners invoking a mix of
corporate, trust and insurance law. Although fourteen Blues plans have
115
converted to for-profit status since 1994, such conversions increasingly
face stiff opposition, and several have been abandoned, apparently out of
116
concern about the approval process. The legal standard applied by state
insurance agencies is, if anything, less clear than that invoked by the
judiciary.
In 2003, the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA) rejected the

111. Id. at *19. The court specifically observed that the assets represent “proceeds of the
sale of corporate assets and not assets of a trust, therefore the cy pres statute does not
apply.” Id.
112. Id. at *18. The court held that the Attorney General’s authority over a nonprofit was
limited to determining whether the board’s business decisions satisfied the business
judgment rule. Id. at *17. Calling upon Delaware law, the court recognized its authority to
“enjoin the ‘transaction of unauthorized business’” if the Attorney General establishes that
the board’s decision was “ultra vires or a perversion of corporate purpose.” Id. at *18.
113. Id. at *26.
114. Id.
115. Laura B. Benko, Curtain Falls: CareFirst Settlement Dims Hope for Blues Conversions,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 16, 2003, at 14. The next conversion battleground is Washington
state, where the Washington Hospital Association is attempting to block the proposed
conversion of Premera Blue Cross. Id.
116. For example, North Carolina Blues withdrew its plan to convert in the face of “a
process with no end in sight.” Plan To Convert North Carolina Blues Withdrawn, in Face of
Regulatory Risks, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY REP., July 9, 2003.
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application of CareFirst BlueCross BlueShield to convert and be acquired
117
by for-profit WellPoint Health Networks, Inc. In a report exceeding 350
pages, the Maryland Insurance Commissioner concluded that the
proposed transaction did not satisfy the public interest standard set forth
in the state’s conversion statute. The report recounted a number of
procedural derelictions, concluding that the bidding process was “flawed
118
and did not produce fair market value.”
The Commissioner’s report relies on a mix of corporate law and
119
regulatory criteria from the state conversion statute. The result is
something of a hodge-podge, with selective application of corporate law
120
principles,
leavened by invocation of various open-ended statutory
criteria that the Commissioner concluded justified departure from
121
straightforward corporate analysis. Much of the report is written in the
language of corporate fiduciary duties, evaluating the board’s diligence
and weighing conflicts of interest. Further, the report imposes an
122
obligation “to obey the articulated mission of the corporation,” and
sweepingly concludes that CareFirst’s nonprofit status conferred special

117. CAREFIRST CONVERSION INFORMATION, MARYLAND INSURANCE COMMISSIONER,
http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/jsp/CareFirst.jsp10?divisionName=CareFirst+Convers
ion+Information&pageName=/jsp/CareFirst.jsp10 (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) (on file with
author) [hereinafter CAREFIRST CONVERSION INFORMATION]. In June 2003, a federal judge
approved a settlement between CareFirst and the Insurance Administration that precludes
CareFirst from considering a conversion to for-profit status for five years. Benko, supra note
115.
118. The auction “appeared designed to, and did, end in a tie on price,” while assets
were undervalued, the transaction did not protect against private inurement of Blue Cross
directors. Overall, the report found that the CareFirst board did not exercise due diligence
in deciding to sell, selecting the purchaser, and negotiating the deal; further, it did not
sufficiently protect against conflicts of interest. CAREFIRST CONVERSION INFORMATION, supra
note 117.
119. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 6.5-301 (2004).
120. The CareFirst opinion specifically refers to MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1
(1999), dealing with the corporate directors generally and codifying the business judgment
rule, and to MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 14-115(c) (2002) for the directors of nonprofit health
service plans. CAREFIRST CONVERSION INFORMATION, supra note 117, at 66.
121. While finding that the state insurance statute “codifies the traditional fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty that historically govern the conduct of directors of both for-profit
and nonprofit corporations,” the report further states that certain entities vested with a
public trust have “a higher degree of care than the directors of a general corporation.” Id.
at 68, 69.
122. Id. at 75.
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123

obligations on its board. At the same time, the opinion expressly declines
to apply some bedrock corporate law standards like the business judgment
124
125
rule or standards applicable to corporate takeovers.
III. STATE FIDUCIARY LAW
As is the case with for-profit businesses (and probably more so), agency
problems make the issue of accountability the central problem that must
126
be addressed by nonprofit organizational law. Until recently, however,
courts and charitable regulators have paid remarkably little attention to
the key mechanisms affecting accountability. As Part II describes, state
attorneys general have brought dozens of cases in recent years that
implicate these issues in contexts ranging from unvarnished corruption to
business reorganizations necessitated by changing economic conditions.
But the glare of the spotlight has only highlighted the manifold
inadequacies of legal doctrine regulating governance of nonprofit
organizations.
This Part summarizes and criticizes nonprofit corporation law
regarding fiduciary duties, which has been a principal tool used by
attorneys general in their cases involving the accountability of nonprofit
boards. The Part first concludes that corporate fiduciary law is too
permissive and uncertain to protect against opportunistic or lax business

123. The Court stated:
CareFirst is a nonprofit corporation. Its [sic] was formed for a public purpose. Its
economic “value” constitutes a public asset. The CareFirst Board is, therefore,
entrusted with an enterprise whose assets belong to the public. The CareFirst
Board was, therefore, required to act with the highest degree a [sic] care . . . .
Id. at 75.
124. The report observes:
The business judgment rule was designed to limit judicial interference in
corporate affairs. . . . The “rule,” as such, has no place in this regulatory proceeding. . . .
[O]versight of the Insurance Administration over insurance regulatory matters
without exception involve evaluation of the substantive outcomes rather than the
process through which those outcomes were derived . . . . Application of the business
judgment rule in that type of setting would simply emasculate the role of the MIA in
evaluating whether or not the company had complied with the statutory standards that
govern financial transactions and financial condition.
Id. at 71-72 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 70; see also infra note 200 (discussing corporate directors’ obligation in
takeover contests under the “Revlon Rule” to accept the highest bid in certain
circumstances).
126. See discussion supra Part I.
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practices. As is true in the for-profit sector, where market discipline and
the possibility of a takeover exerts some pressures, nonprofit corporate law
cannot be relied upon to police the activities of nonprofit managers and
directors. Second, there is reason to doubt that fiduciary law can ensure
that managers and directors remain faithful to the nonprofit’s corporate
mission or will be effective in vetting decisions to alter the mission.
A. Fiduciary Theory and the Nonprofit Commercial Enterprise: An Uneasy Fit
Fiduciary law, embodied in common law duties, statutory standards,
and equitable principles, is the primary legal mechanism for assuring
127
accountability in American corporations. The chief significance of these
duties lies in their capacity to address principal-agent problems inherent in
128
the corporate form. In the for-profit context, agency costs, principally
those arising from information asymmetries, limit the ability of residual
claimants to monitor the activities of corporate managers in all forms of
business association. For nonprofit corporations, the principal-agent
problem is magnified in at least two ways: first, that the principal may be an
indefinite class (e.g., donors, public beneficiaries of charity, governmental
entities, etc.), whose interests may diverge, and second, that the
relationship between the (uncertain) principal and agent is not specified

127. Fiduciaries are those undertaking a duty to act for the benefit of others as to matters
within the scope of their fiduciary relationship. In the context of business associations,
fiduciaries (i.e. corporate directors, who are also sometimes confusingly referred to as
“trustees”) are held to a good faith standard. James Fishman, Improving Charitable
Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 232 (2003); see infra notes 155-169 and accompanying text.
In the charitable trust context, fiduciaries (“trustees”) hold property subject “to equitable
duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose,” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 348 (1959), and are governed by strict responsibilities to avoid all conflicts of
interest, to preserve assets, and to act with prudence and due care. Fishman, supra at 228-31.
This standard is more exacting than the standard applied in the context of business
associations. Id. at 231.
128. The issue of agency costs has been the centerpiece of the debate for those
attempting to develop a viable theory of the modern corporation. As Berle and Means
observed seventy years ago, “The separation of ownership from control produces a
condition where the interests of the owner and of the ultimate manager may, and often do,
diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power
disappear.” ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1933); see Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principal, supra note 18, at 47378 (1996); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999
WIS. L. REV. 227, 252.
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with exactness in either the entity’s charter or the law. The fundamental
objective of fiduciary duties in the corporate context, then, is to bind
managers to serve their principals’ interests and thereby overcome the
130
high agency costs inherent in the corporate form.
Close examination of the structure and economics of the nonprofit
firm exposes paradoxes in extending corporate principles to charitable
corporations. First and most fundamentally, the nonprofit faces greater
obstacles in overcoming agency costs than its for-profit counterparts
because it lacks residual claimants. The ability of the capital market to
monitor and police the actions of managers in the for-profit sector is
131
generally acknowledged. Interested shareholders can also serve those
functions through the mechanisms of corporate democracy, including
election of directors, proxy contests and other means of shareholder
“activism.” However, because the principal of the nonprofit corporation is
not readily identifiable, there is no claimant with sufficient incentives to
monitor agents’ abuses. Further, even if some altruists were willing to act as
132
monitors, existing legal regimes provide few direct remedies for abuses.

129. See Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note 18, at 486; Manne, supra note 128, at
234.
130. Other theoretical analyses cast the agency problems in corporate governance in a
different light. De-emphasizing the role of fiduciary duties, contractarian scholars argue for
a combination of market incentives, enforceable contracts, and other external constraints
on opportunism within firms. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of
Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-8 (1990); John H.
Langbein, The Contactarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995). By this
account, fiduciary duties should be seen as “fundamentally contractual” with law enabling
parties to adjust duties to suit their particular relationships and achieve economically
efficient outcomes. This frame, however, assumes conditions sufficient to enable workable
bargaining and mutual exchanges. Applying strict contractarian analyses to nonprofit
organizations faces intractable problems given the absence of meaningful bargaining
between patrons and agents and the lack of market for mechanisms to monitor their
behavior. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1403-04 (1985). See generally Deborah A. DeMott, SelfDealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131 (1993).
131. While serious questions exist about the sufficiency of capital markets to accomplish
these objectives, see infra notes 171-172, the extensive literature on corporate governance is
in substantial agreement that the market for corporate control has some chastening effect
on managers and directors.
132. See Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., 112 S.W.3d 486, 506-07 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2002) (noting that nonprofit statute allows members to bring a “derivative-like”
action, but where no members exist, it is left to the attorney general to respond to breaches
of fiduciary duties and where necessary, to seek dissolution).
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Lacking effective monitors to demand accountability, one might expect
legal doctrine to provide substitute mechanisms to trigger regulatory
review in well-defined circumstances. As we shall see, such is not the case.
133
A caveat is necessary at this point. Public and sponsored hospitals
provide an interesting wrinkle in this “absence of residual claimant”
134
problem. In this context, local governments and sponsors frequently

133. We use the term “sponsored” to refer to entities controlled by a religious
organization, such as an order of Catholic sisters. Professor Singer predicts that Catholicsponsored hospitals and attorneys general in particular are on a collision course, as:
[A]ttorneys general and local communities [are] beginning to rigorously
question the use of charitable assets. At the same time, Church law clearly vests
control of the health care institution and, to a large extent, disposition of its
assets in the sponsoring religious congregation. Challenges to sponsor strategies
are beginning. There is little doubt that the continued need of sponsors to
respond to ministry pressures will, more frequently, result in litigation to contest
sponsor authority and direction.
See Singer, supra note 2, at 164-65.
134. Of course, some nonprofits (including charitable entities) have structures that
mimic “ownership” to some extent. Both public benefit and mutual benefit corporations
may have members with rights to elect directors. Under the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (RMNCA), members of corporations are entitled to vote for directors,
while public benefit corporations may have members. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT
§§ 6.02, 6.03 (1987). Despite having control and governance powers inherent in possessing
voting rights, members are not analogous to shareholders in all other respects. Most
obviously, they lack any claim to profits: Distributions to members are forbidden except that
mutuals may distribute to members on dissolution. Reserved powers are rights of control
vested in members that normally are held by the corporation’s Board of Directors. These
reserved powers may include power over major operational decisions, sales or conversions,
and approval of budgets. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Decision-makers Without Duties:
Defining the Duties of Parent Corporations Acting As Sole Corporate Members in Nonprofit Healthcare
Systems, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 979 (2001). In addition, members may also may have “reserved
powers” to make operational decisions thus bypassing the traditional powers of boards and
management. Reserved powers are rights of control vested in members that normally are
held by the corporation’s Board of Directors. These reserved powers may include power
over major operational decisions, sales or conversions, and approval of budgets. See
Brakman Reiser, supra, at 991. Some nonprofit statutes have recognized these distinctions
and applied slightly stricter fiduciary standards to boards of public benefit corporations
because of the general absence of members to monitor governance of those organizations.
REVISED NONPROFIT MODEL CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1987); Lizabeth A. Moody, The Who, What, and
How of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 251, 274 (1988) (noting
that RMNCA drafters believed it “essential to find devices to hold directors [of nonprofits
without members] accountable”). As a general matter, however, members are best
understood as relating to the nonprofit organization by virtue of their participation and
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behave as “owners” that provide a consistency of vision and accountability,
thereby possibly being even more efficient than shareholders in their
oversight of the corporation’s managers. While their existence may
ameliorate the “residual claimant” problem in one sense, sponsored
hospitals present another analytical challenge. While they may indeed
represent well patients’ interests, particularly when they are an on-going
enterprise, they also have significant interests of their own, which are easily
and powerfully exercised. In short, corporate theories do not account for
the “member” corporation, whose members have their independent
missions, loyalties, and financial pressures that might be resolved by
redeployment of the assets of “subsidiary” corporations.
A second factor undermining the efficacy of fiduciary law in nonprofit
corporations is that their goals are multi-faceted and often not welldefined. While managers of business corporations must strictly observe the
over-arching objective of profit maximization, their nonprofit counterparts
face a more complex array of goals. Although generating net income is
surely an important objective (especially in commercial not-for-profit
organizations), it is also necessary to simultaneously accommodate the
other, competing objectives of the organization articulated in the mission.
Thus, nonprofit managers and directors must reconcile business objectives
and mission. Complicating the task further is the fact that the mission
objectives are often stated in general terms that lack the precise,
135
quantifiable frame posed by the profit maximization standard. While
vague standards may appear to ensure flexibility and maximize director
136
discretion, the other side of the coin is that they may invite freewheeling

limited governance role in the corporation as distinguished from having a financial
investment in the entity. Id. at 270 (“[M]embers generally relate to the organization by
participation rather than by the financial interest generated by an investment.”); id. at 273
(noting that the membership relationship in nonprofits is much more personal than
shareholders’ relationship to for-profit corporations).
135. See Goldschmid, supra note 57, at 641 (“The obligation of the nonprofit directors
and officers with respect to the corporation’s mission creates a more difficult and complex
decision-making process for them than for their for-profit peers.”); see also Manne, supra
note 128, at 235-36 (“[T]he analytical power of the theory of the firm does not readily
transfer to the realm of nonprofits. . . . [S]trong conclusions in the for-profit context
regarding incentives and capacities to minimize agency problems are weaker in the
nonprofit context.”).
136. See, e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 57, at 641 (noting it would be in accordance with
the duty of care in business to the responsibilities for directors of the nonprofit hospitals to
accept the lower bid from one of several suitors because the winning bidder would provide
a higher level of public benefit to the community).
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regulatory interventions that can bring carefully planned business
strategies to a halt.
The efficacy of fiduciary principles is further hampered by the scarcity
137
of precedents. Only a handful of cases address the duties of care and
138
139
loyalty; mention of the duty of obedience is even rarer. This is in part
due to state law limiting standing to challenge breaches of the fiduciary
140
duties to attorneys general, members, and directors. However, state
charity enforcers, particularly attorneys general, are notoriously
circumscribed by a lack of investigative resources and the dearth of
information about managerial abuses or contemplated business decisions
141
owing to the minimal disclosure requirements applicable to nonprofits.
Also limiting precedent is the attraction of settlement to both states and
boards: State regulators and attorneys general focus on “fixing the

137. A search on Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com, using the following terms: “‘duty of
care,’ w/5 director! trustee & nonprofit charitable not-for-profit,” found only ten reported
decisions involving the duty of care in nonprofit corporations, three of which were cases
decided on other grounds, and therefore did not explicate the duty. Search on Westlaw, All
State Cases Database (Mar. 11, 2004).
138. A search on Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com, using the terms: “‘duty of loyalty,’
w/5 director! trustee & nonprofit charitable not-for-profit,” produced five nonprofit cases
which discussed the duty of loyalty. Search on Westlaw, All State Cases Database (Mar. 11,
2004); see also 2 FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW §§ 5-15 to 5-16 (2000).
139. A search on Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com, using the search terms: “‘duty of
obedience’ w/ 5 director! trustee & nonprofit charitable not-for-profit,” produced one
nonprofit case which discussed the duty of obedience. Only one case has cited the duty of
obedience since 1984. Search on Westlaw, All State Cases Database (Nov. 20, 2004); see also 2
FURROW ET AL., supra note 138, § 5-17 (listing cases and describing the duty of obedience).
140. See DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 92 (1988)
(most states deny standing to persons other than members, directors and attorneys
general); see also 2 FURROW ET AL., supra note 138, § 5-18 (standing occasionally but rarely
recognized for donors and others with “special interest”); Developments in the Law-Nonprofit
Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1594-98 (1992); Manne, supra note 128, at 241
(“Standing limitations for nonprofit entities are grounded largely in the outdated notion of
the state as parens patriae, and thus . . . have relegated enforcement to the exclusive province
of the state.”). While some statutes and court decisions have granted standing to members
and directors of not-for-profits, this adds little protection because it tends to make the goat
the keeper of the cabbage patch. Rarely is standing recognized even for donors and others
with a “special interest,” much less for members of the community the nonprofit serves. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Stuhlfire, 547 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. App. 1990) (allowing members of
nonprofit to bring suit); John v. John, 450 N.W.2d 795 (Wis. App. 1989), cert. denied 498 U.S.
814 (1990) (allowing directors to sue co-director).
141. Fishman, supra note 127, at 259-65.
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142

problem,” not necessarily getting to root causes. Boards, comprised of
volunteers, are notoriously risk-averse and eager to avoid sullying their own
143
or their institution’s standing in the community. A consensus view is that
applying for-profit corporate fiduciary standards to charitable corporations
has proved inadequate to deter wrongdoing or to encourage responsible
144
stewardship. As Harvey Goldschmid stated, “[T]he central paradox of
nonprofit corporate governance . . . is the fact that the nation’s nonprofit
institutions are the recipients of so much public and private largess—in
terms of gifts, grants, tax benefits, volunteer efforts, and other subsidies—
145
and yet are subjected to so few accountability constraints.” Questioning
146
the efficacy of fiduciary law generally, many academic commentators
147
have proposed stricter standards for nonprofits.
By the same token, wholesale importation of for-profit corporate law
gives short shrift to the nuanced role of directors of commercial

142. See id. at 268-69.
143. See Manne, supra note 128, at 245; see also Goldschmid, supra note 57, at 643 (citing
forbearance by state regulators and understaffing as limiting enforcement of fiduciary
duties).
144. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 86 (1995); see also Demott, supra note 130, at 146-47 (“[I]t is foolish to import
for-profit norms respecting self-dealing generally into the nonprofit context. Governance
mechanisms are so much weaker in the nonprofit sector that loose controls on self-dealing
create unacceptably high risks of misconduct.”); Goldschmid, supra note 57, at 643
(describing fiduciary standards as “aspirational” and proposing stronger enforcement);
Manne, supra note 128, at 239 (“Much has been written about the application of fiduciary
duties to directors of nonprofits, and all of it call for some reform in this area . . . . [T]he
current regime is commonly viewed as inadequate.”); see also Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit
Corporation Law, supra note 4, at 568 (describing standard of conduct regarding conflicts of
interest for nonprofit directors as “too weak”).
145. Goldschmid, supra note 57, at 632; see also Brody, Agents Without Principals, supra note
18, at 457-71; Manne, supra note 128, at 227-30.
146. Singer, supra note 68, at 237 (citing “subtle nuances and reasonable
characterizations that can be attached to signing bonuses and other forms of executive
compensation” that make it difficult to prove breaches of duty of loyalty).
147. DeMott, supra note 130, at 135-36 (noting the charitable trust model as a potential
alternative to the corporate model adopted in the RMNCA); Thomas H. Boyd, Note, A Call
to Reform the Duties of Directors Under State Not-For-Profit Corporation Statutes, 72 IOWA L. REV.
725, 744 (1987) (proposing that trustee standards should apply to public benefit
nonprofits, while corporate standards should apply to mutual benefit nonprofits); see
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, supra note 4, at 570 (arguing that a strict
prohibition on director self-dealing in nonprofit corporations would have “an enormously
salutary effect”).
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nonprofits—one that demands a balance of mission and margin. Critical to
the success of any legal regime is preserving the managerial discretion
necessary for the efficient operation of the nonprofit as a business
148
enterprise. External review imposes costs, such as increased risk aversion,
transaction costs, and uncertainty in business decisions. The most obvious
risk is that overly intrusive oversight may reduce efficiency, as impaired
managerial discretion may constrain risk-taking and innovation.
Less widely appreciated is the danger that such reviews may pose to the
corporation’s charitable mission. As the Delaware Supreme Court recently
acknowledged, strict application of corporate standards may be anomalous
in the nonprofit setting: “Although principles of corporate law generally
govern the activities of . . . a [charitable] corporation, its fiduciaries have a
149
special duty to advance its charitable goals and protect its assets.” The
threat of extensive second-guessing by regulators may tend to cause
directors of charitable enterprises to substitute for their own judgments
those of the regulators. When governmental actors exercise a heavy hand,
they risk blurring public and private decision-making.
Finally, extensive regulatory oversight may undermine the norms that
guide managers’ behavior. As recent scholarship examining the role of
trust and other extra-legal forces suggests, norms and other forms of social
ordering that arise outside of the legal system strongly impact behavior of
150
business managers. There is reason to believe norms play a vital function
in nonprofits: Board members and managers take their cues from their
institution’s mission and history and are driven by social forces such as
151
prestige and embarrassment rather than threat of legal sanction. Yet the

148. Stephen Bainbridge summarizes the problem as follows:
Neither discretion nor accountability can be ignored, because both promote
values essential to the survival of business organizations. Unfortunately, they are
ultimately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without also having less of
the other. Managers cannot be made more accountable without undermining
their discretionary authority. Establishing the proper mix of discretion and
accountability thus emerges as the central corporate governance question . . . .
STEVEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 38 (2002).
149. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 472-3 (Del. 1991).
150. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2001) (trustworthy behavior
helps explain the “puzzling persistence of cooperative patterns of behavior in firms in
circumstances in which legal and market sanctions are ineffective or unavailable”).
151. Describing the paradox of the fact that nonprofit managers tend to “adhere to good
practices, and demonstrate fidelity to the organization’s mission and the eleemosynary
ideal” despite facing only abstract legal standards and scant enforcement, Professor
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impact of legal commands is uncertain. Law may work to support social
152
norms by its expressive effects
or weaken them by perversely
153
undermining their social significance.
B. Applying the Fiduciary Duties to Commercial Nonprofits in the Health Care
Sector

Despite the inadequacies associated with applying corporate law to the
nonprofit context, it has become the template for all state nonprofit
154
statutes. Almost every state applies the for-profit standard, rather than
the more exacting trust standard, to nonprofit corporations. Somewhat
startling is the fact that the special considerations raised by the nondistribution constraint and the mission of the nonprofit corporation are
given only nodding recognition in statutes and case law dealing with
fiduciary duties. As discussed below, a third duty, sometimes called a duty
of obedience, pays some heed to directors’ responsibilities to protect and
promote their corporation’s charitable mission. However, to date the case
law governing nonprofits has failed to satisfactorily integrate the dictates of
charitable responsibilities with the duties of care and loyalty imported from
the for-profit corporate model. We discuss briefly the standards of the
three fiduciary duties and then analyze some of the conundrums they pose
for directors of nonprofit health care charities.
1. The Duty of Care
The duty of care is traditionally characterized by a three-part test
Fishman writes, “Why is the level of fidelity so high? Why do most fiduciaries do what is
right? The answer may be that most charitable fiduciaries have internalized the norms of
appropriate behavior. Accountability is a normative issue that reflects the role of the
nonprofit sector in law and society.” Fishman, supra note 127, at 242.
152. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 202425 (1996).
153. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001).
154. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1987) (nonprofit duty of care
and good faith); id. § 8.31 (nonprofit duty of loyalty). In drafting the Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, the ABA essentially used the for-profit model act as a template, electing
not to employ a different approach, as recommended by some, that recognized the
dramatic differences between the two corporate forms. As a result, the scarce common law
that has evolved in the interim has, until recently, not developed a distinct “nonprofit” body
of law.
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inquiring into whether directors acted “in good faith,” with that level of
care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise in like
circumstances and in a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best
interest of the corporation. The seeming negligence-focused formulation,
however, is mitigated by the application of the business judgment rule,
which establishes a rebuttable presumption that directors who employ
appropriate processes in the course of their decision-making have satisfied
the duty of care. The business judgment rule essentially changes the
negligence standard suggested by the technical articulation of the duty of
care to one of gross negligence or recklessness by focusing on the decisionmaking process. Directors who make decisions that are informed, in good
faith, and clear of conflicts of interest will avoid judicial scrutiny
155
altogether. The important caveat that the decision be the product of an
informed judgment limits somewhat the rule’s potentially all-encompassing
156
sweep and bars its application in situations of nonfeasance. In addition,
recent decisions by some courts suggest that boards that consciously
disregard risks fail to satisfy the “good faith” requirement and will not
157
enjoy the rule’s protection.
State courts have applied the business judgment rule to nonprofit
158
directors, utilizing standards derived from the corporate context.
155. See generally AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § IV (Proposed Final Draft, 1992); DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (4th ed. 1993).
156. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993); Smith v. Van
Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 148, at 242-86 (contrasting
precedent treating the business judgment rule as a substitute standard of review versus a
rule of abstention).
157. See In re Abbot Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2003); In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). The Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court states that the evolving standard requires “honesty of purpose and
eschews a disingenuous mindset of appearing or claiming to act for the corporate good, but
not caring for the well-being of the constituents of the fiduciary.” E. Norman Veasey,
Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron WorldCom Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 839, 851 (2003).
158. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently expressed concern that “[d]irectors of
nonprofits may take fewer risks than would be optimal if they were overly concerned about
liability for well meaning decisions.” Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883
(Minn. 2003); see also Beard v. Achenbach Mem’l Hosp. Ass’n, 170 F.2d 859 (10th Cir.
1948); Scheuer Family Found., Inc. v. 61 Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d 662 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); 2
FURROW ET AL., supra note 138, §5-15; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 144, at 185
(describing the rule as “more appropriately known in the nonprofit context as the best
judgment rule” and as providing “if a director has made a decision by informing herself in
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Although common law rarely addresses explicitly the propriety of applying
the business judgment rule to nonprofit corporations, those courts that
159
have faced the question have accepted the rule. In reality, however,
despite the lofty standard of diligence provided by statutory and common
law formulations, the duty of care very rarely results in courts imposing
160
sanctions upon directors. The business judgment rule protects almost all
judgments by directors as long as they are plausibly “informed.” Some
scholars have sought to explain this “schizophrenic” state of affairs by
stressing the central role of trust in shaping behavior and suggesting that
the law may reinforce trustworthy behavior by influencing the internal
preferences of actors in contrast to affecting the external incentives they
161
encounter.
2. The Duty of Loyalty
In the business corporation context, the duty of loyalty flows from the
directors’ duty to maximize shareholder wealth. This philosophical
underpinning poses obvious difficulty for application to the nonprofit
corporation, which does not have shareholders, whose legal form rests on a
commitment to a charitable enterprise, and whose mission therefore is not

good faith without a disabling conflict of interest, there will be neither judicial inquiry nor
liability even if the action was unfortunate for the organization or its membership.”);
MICHAEL W. PEREGRINE & JAMES R. SCHWARTZ, THE APPLICATION OF NONPROFIT CORPORATION
LAW TO HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONS 44-45 (2002).
159. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 883 & n.2 (Minn. 2003) (noting it
found no case rejecting the business judgment rule in the nonprofit context, and that the
Supreme Courts of Alabama, Hawaii, and South Dakota, as well as intermediate appellate
courts of Colorado, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin have
applied the business judgment rule to nonprofit boards); see also Beard, 170 F.2d 859; Woo
Chul Lee v. Interinsurance Exch., 50 Cal. App. 4th 694 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Oberly v.
Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 462 (Del. 1991) (“A court cannot second-guess the wisdom of facially
valid decisions made by charitable fiduciaries, any more than it can question the business
judgment of the directors of a for-profit corporation.”); Scheuer Family Found., 582 N.Y.S.2d
at 662.
160. In cases involving for-profit corporations, under the business judgment rule the
standard of care is almost uniformly applied only to review the process by which decisions
are made, not the result. In only a handful of cases have courts found directors liable under
this standard, and few, if any, find liability for even egregious mistakes in judgment. See
Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Care and the Business
Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237 (1986). See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Director’s Duty of Care in Negotiated Dispositions, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 579 (1997).
161. Blair & Stout, supra note 150, at 1737-38.
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primarily wealth maximization. The question then becomes whether the
corporate notion of the duty of loyalty can be usefully reformulated to
ensure appropriate director behavior and preservation of the charitable
162
mission in the nonprofit context.
The duty of loyalty also governs the individual board member’s
relations with the corporation of which she is a director. Interestingly,
neither courts nor legislatures have interpreted the duty of loyalty in the
for-profit context as prohibiting outright self-dealing and other conflicted
163
interest transactions. In general, the law prohibits only those self-dealing
transactions that are not approved or ratified by the board of directors or
shareholders under specified standards. In the business corporation
context, approval may be gained by the vote of a disinterested majority of
the board of directors or by a majority of disinterested shareholders
164
provided the terms of the transaction are fully disclosed prior to the vote.
In the nonprofit context, most states appear to have applied the business
165
corporation standard in addressing the duty of loyalty, although some
states have imposed somewhat more stringent standards for self-dealing
166
transactions.
3. The Duty of Obedience
A third duty, applicable only to the directors of nonprofit
corporations, is the duty of obedience. Although articulated as a distinct
162. The case law using duty of loyalty in this way is virtually non-existent. But see
Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504-31 (2002)
(describing the duty of loyalty as one intended to ensure effective performance of mission
by directors).
163. Neither wants to deny the nonprofit entity the potential of a board member
facilitating beneficial contracts or business relationships for the nonprofit. KURTZ, supra
note 140, at 60-61, 63.
164. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001); REVISED MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31
(1983); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 365 (Del. 1993) (characterizing
Delaware statute as “a legislative mandate that . . . an approving vote of a majority of
informed and disinterested directors shall remove any taint of director or directors’ selfinterest in a transaction”).
165. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.31 (1987); see also, e.g., 15 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5715 (West 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-31-830(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2003).
166. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233 (West 2004) (requiring that transactions be fair
and reasonable at the time entered into and approved by a majority of the board, which
must consist entirely of disinterested members; it must also be shown that the board
determined, after reasonable inquiry, that a more advantageous deal could not be
obtained).
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167

fiduciary duty in only a handful of cases, the concept appears to have
168
been broadly popularized by the work of Daniel Kurtz, presumably to
overcome the perceived deficiencies of applying the duty of loyalty to the
nonprofit corporate board. Broadly construed, the duty of obedience
expresses the obligation of nonprofit directors to observe and advance the
mission of the charitable corporation by adhering to its purposes, usually
as set forth in the entity’s articles of incorporation or bylaws. However, in
the few instances in which it is specifically mentioned by courts, it has been
invoked to indicate directors’ responsibility to assure that their
corporations obey the law and not stray from the dictates of the purposes
169
expressed in their articles and bylaws. In various cases in which courts
have dealt with nonprofit hospitals seeking to change their business to
provide health care services other than acute care, the concept limits such
170
changes unless permitted by the corporation’s articles.
C. Practical Problems with Applying Fiduciary Duties to Nonprofit Boards and
Managers

Even in the for-profit context, the efficacy of common law and
statutory duties in ensuring that directors meet their fiduciary duties is the
subject of considerable debate. A raft of studies examining the failures of
oversight in the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and other corporate scandals

167. See, e.g., Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct.
1999).
168. See KURTZ, supra note 140, at 84-85.
169. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 144, at 230 (“The duty of obedience resembles
the trustees’ duty to administer a trust in a manner faithful to wishes of creator . . . . Thus,
the director has a duty to follow the purposes and powers as expressed in the
[corporation’s] governing legal documents.” (citation omitted)). The duty of obedience is
regarded by some commentators as a particularized obligation under the duty of loyalty or
care. See e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 57, at 650.
170. For example, in Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36 (Ct. App. 1977), a
religious order sought to close a hospital in order to provide health services to the indigent
through outpatient neighborhood clinics. Even though the articles of incorporation
indicated several purposes, the court interpreted them to require continuing operation of a
hospital. Id. at 40-41. In Attorney Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Mass.
1986), trustees of a hospital sought to sell its assets in order to become a grant-making
institution for health care institutions. The Court allowed the trustees to amend the articles
to do so but noted without such provision they would have violated fiduciary duties. Id. at
1018-19.

44

1 ART_BOOZANG

12/23/2004 4:30 PM

MISSION, MARGIN, AND TRUST IN THE NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE ENTERPRISE
171

points to the insufficiency of director oversight in the for-profit sector.
The emerging consensus that fiduciary duties are no substitute for other
means of assuring honesty and diligence by corporate managers would
172
seem to apply a fortiori to nonprofit entities. Adding to the problems

171. See, e.g., First Interim Report of Dick Thornburgh, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, In re
Worldcom Inc., No. 02-15533(AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4 2002), http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/worldcom/thornburgh1strpt.pdf
(citing
“numerous
failures,
inadequacies and breakdowns” among the “Board of Directors, the Audit Committee, the
Company’s system of internal controls and the independent auditors.”); AM. BAR ASS’N TASK
FORCE ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE
ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 25, 29 (2003) (finding outside directors “overly dependent
upon and overly passive with respect to senior executive officers” and recommending that
“outside directors abandon the passive role many have been content to play and replace it
with a new culture stressing constructive skepticism and an active, independent oversight
role”); WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION 148 (2002), http://i.cnn.net/cnn/
2002/LAW/02/02/enron.report/powers.report.pdf (describing oversight by Enron’s
Board and Management as “cursory”; stating that Board “did not fully appreciate the
significance of some of the significant information that came before it”; and characterizing
controls put in place governing self dealing as inadequate); see also William H. Donaldson,
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Remarks at the 2003 Washington
Economic Policy Conference before the National Association for Business Economics (Mar.
24, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032403whd.htm (“[I]nattention to good
corporate governance practices over the past decade or more is at the heart of what has
gone so terribly wrong in corporate America in the past few years . . . . [A]t too many
companies, the chief executive position has steadily increased in power and influence. In
some cases, the CEO had become more of a monarch than a manager. Many boards have
become gradually more deferential to the opinions, judgments and decisions of the CEO
and senior management team. This deference has been an obstacle to directors’ ability to
satisfy the responsibility that the owners—the shareholders—have delegated and entrusted
to them.”).
172. Besides suggesting that the potential for abuse was larger than previously suspected,
the well-documented shortcoming in the for-profit sector is all the more startling because of
the enormous phalanx of analysts and experts that monitor the securities markets and
institutional investors ostensibly monitoring directors’ behavior. The lack of comparable
watchdogs in the nonprofit sector suggests that directorial abuse might be even harder to
detect. Further, extensive corporate scholarship identifies a number of factors, all
applicable to nonprofit boards, which impair effective director oversight. For example
Professors Bebchuk, Fried and Walker persuasively explain excesses in executive
compensation by demonstrating the subtle conflicts that arise out of mangers’ influence
over the appointment of directors, the effects of board decision-making dynamics, and the
impact of directors’ lack of independently supplied information. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk
et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI.
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associated with relying on fiduciary principles are multiple administrative
173
limitations facing state charitable enforcers. Attorneys general lack
resources, access to information, and expertise to effectively monitor
conduct of the extensive and economically significant commercial
174
nonprofit sector.
The numerous examples of abject breaches of oversight
responsibilities by directors of major commercial health care charities raise
serious doubt as to how effectively the fiduciary duties serve their
prophylactic function of averting abuse and encouraging director
vigilance. For example, as described in Subsection II.A, in a number of
high profile conversions of nonprofit health plans in the early 1990s,
insiders personally profited from lucrative arrangements and sales that
took place for vastly undervalued amounts, resulting in losses of billions of
175
dollars of charitable assets. The fact that few, if any, of the directors
involved in these cases were held to account under fiduciary theories
confirms the view that the duties are “relatively weak weapon[s] in the

L. REV. 751 (2002); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL.
L. REV. 1275 (2002).
173. Although the Delaware courts have recently signaled an intention to apply the
requirement of good faith more aggressively, that standard nevertheless requires a showing
that directors “consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t
care about the risks’ attitude . . . .” In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289
(Del. Ch. 2003); see also In re Abbot Labs. Derivative Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 807-11 (7th Cir.
2003) (finding absence of good faith where directors were aware of extensive safety
problems leading to large civil fine and took no efforts to remedy them).
174. James Fishman has catalogued a number of deficiencies including the fact that few
states even have charities sections within the attorneys general office, staffing is minimal,
and responsibilities are often divided with other agencies in a way that impairs effective
oversight. Fishman, supra note 127, at 262-63. In addition, attorneys general lack staff to
efficiently review information provided in mandatory reporting such as Form 990 and are
unable to effectively share information with IRS or other state enforcers. Id. at 263-65.
175. Examples are legions of vastly underpriced sales of assets of nonprofits, often
engineered by insiders who ultimately profited by stock ownership in or lucrative
employment agreements with the purchaser. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 96, at 785
(estimating actual value of assets of California’s Health Net HMO to be approximately
500% higher than originally estimated and describing funding of charitable foundations on
conversion of PacifiCare Health Systems at less than 1% of actual value of the enterprise).
For a detailed account of the numerous instances of under-valuation in such conversions
and the successful efforts of the Consumers Union to have hundreds of millions of dollars
turned over to independent foundations, see Eleanor Hamburger et al., The Pot of Gold:
Monitoring Health Care Conversions Can Yield Billions of Dollars for Health Care, 29
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 473 (1995).
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arsenals of attorneys general” for dealing with such problems. Although
subsequent intervention by consumer groups caused attorneys general to
review and ultimately challenge some (but far from all) of these
transactions, few if any directors were personally prosecuted. Responding
to the problem posed by conversions, by 1998 over twenty-five states and
177
the District of Columbia had adopted legislation. However, most of the
nonprofit conversion statutes do not change the substantive standard for
178
review of fiduciary breaches.
As an example of the problems associated with relying on fiduciary law
to police nonprofit governance, consider the complete breakdown in
governance that was central to the demise of AHERF, discussed in
Subsection II.A. Several careful studies of AHERF place prime
responsibility on its boards for effectively ceding governance to the CEO
and accepting a model of corporate control designed to prevent effective
oversight. Multiple and overly large boards thwarted effective discussion or
analysis of corporate policy and the CEO’s domination of the board
(through selection process and personal ties) discouraged any meaningful
179
board input. When one holds this framework up against the lenient
standard widely applied under the duty of care, however, it is entirely
180
possible that the board members might have avoided personal liability.
176. Singer, supra note 68, at 237.
177. Christopher W. Frost, Financing Public Health Through Nonprofit Conversion
Foundations, 90 KY. L.J. 935, 953 (2001-2002).
178. See generally MODEL ACT FOR NONPROFIT HEALTHCARE CONVERSIONS (1998), reprinted
in GREANEY & SCHWARTZ, supra note 63; FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 144, at 185; Kevin F.
Donohue, Crossroads in Hospital Conversions—A Survey of Nonprofit Hospital Conversions, 8
ANNALS HEALTH L. 39 (1999).
179. Burns, et al., supra note 72, at 21-22; see also Michael W. Peregrine & James R.
Schwartz, Revisiting the Duty of Care of the Nonprofit Director, 36 J. HEALTH L. 183, 201 (2003).
180. A recent account by one of AHERF’s insiders that is highly critical of top
management explains that the Boards were supplied with extensive information, perhaps so
much so that they were unable to digest it and properly supervise management.
It might be reasonable to suppose that the [AHERF] trustees were unable to see
and perhaps prevent the oncoming train wreck because they were
underinformed. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The trustees of
the constituent corporations of HERF and of AHERF itself were regularly given
reams of information, including detailed financial statements. Although it would
have taken a reader of financials with extraordinary insight to discern from one
of the constituent corporation’s statements how all of AHERF was doing, there
was enough crossover on the various boards that there was a core of trustees who
had most if not all of the relevant information available to them. The more likely
scenario, in fact is that the trustees had too much information; they were given so
much to absorb that they could not winnow out what was important.
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Even with such a remarkable record of inattentiveness, the business
judgment rule may have afforded protection, as it requires only that
directors be reasonably informed. Moreover, to pass the process-oriented
information hurdle, directors can rely on ostensibly trustworthy surrogates
to supply expertise and evaluation. Assuming the AHERF boards were
reasonably attentive to information placed before them and relied on the
advice of executives and responsible intermediaries, there is every
likelihood that their conduct would enjoy the protection of the business
181
judgment rule.
The ineffectiveness of the fiduciary duties in policing board behavior
has spurred charitable regulators to invoke charitable trust law to supply a
more stringent standard of conduct. For example, the Attorney General of
182
Minnesota’s business compliance reviews of the Allina Health System and
183
HealthPartners examined in extraordinary detail the day-to-day business
184
decisions of those companies. Attorney General Hatch claimed that the

ANDREW E. THURMAN, INSIDE AHERF: LESSONS LEARNED, http://www.thurman
healthlaw.com/INSIDE%20AHERF.doc (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
181. Ultimately, the AHERF president “pleaded no contest to a single misdemeanor
count of misusing charitable funds by virtue of having diverted endowment funds of a
hospital to finance the organization’s operating costs.” FREMONT-SMITH & KOSARAS, supra
note 56, at 9-10. The AHERF CFO pled to a single misdemeanor and paid a small fine.
Three senior AHERF financial executives, including the CFO entered into civil consent
decrees with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission and, without admitting
wrongdoing, paid fines. THURMAN, supra note 180, at 1.
182. See Press Release, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office (Sept. 24, 2001), http://
www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/PR/pr_allina_mou_92401.htm; see also Vince Galloro, Watch
It! Attorneys General Become More Active as Healthcare Finances Grab Public Eye, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Aug. 13, 2001, at 16 (describing fourteen-month investigation of Allina and
revelations that its HMO subsidiary spent $56 million on consultants over three year period
and “coached executives through team-building exercises, such as playing ring toss, and
showed movies to teach . . . officials about group dynamics”); supra Subsection II.B.1.
183. See In re HealthPartners, Inc., No. MC 03-001587 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Prob. Div. June 10,
2003) (stipulation and order for the appointment of a Special Administrator).
184. The Attorney General determined management’s expenses, travel and executive
compensation to be “lavish,” to the point of deeming inappropriate a room service charge
for breakfast while attending a conference where a continental breakfast was available. The
Attorney General’s findings of inappropriate luxuries may be found at Minn. Att’y Gen,
Summary
of
Executive
Compensation
Expenses,
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/
consumer/PDF/HealthPartners_ExecComp_.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); Minn. Att’y
Gen, Summary of HealthPartners Consulting Expenses, http://www.ag.state.
mn.us/consumer/PDF/HealthPartners_Consulting_Expenses.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2004); and Minn. Att’y Gen, Chapter I: Travel and Entertainment, http://www.ag.state.
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boards had failed in their oversight of senior management and had
neglected their responsibilities to exercise independent judgment. Citing a
variety of “governance failures” by the HealthPartners’s Board, the
Attorney General petitioned for the appointment of two “special
185
administrators” to act as trustees of the HealthPartners charitable trust.”
The Attorney General’s legal theory rested on an amalgam of
charitable trust and corporate law. Its legal brief asserted that Minnesota
law subjects nonprofit board members to charitable trust standards by
virtue of the fact that the corporation holds charitable assets. It charged
that poorly documented or excessive expenditures “waste[d]” corporate
186
assets and ineffective oversight breaches directors’ fiduciary duties.
Rather confusingly, the Attorney General cited the duties of care and
obedience from nonprofit corporate law for these propositions along with
conclusory statements that the stricter charitable trust standard should
187
apply. It is highly doubtful that a court would find a breach of fiduciary
duty under the nonprofit corporate standard in these circumstances (the
court never reached the question of whether charitable trust law could be
188
imported to supply a stricter standard). The corporate waste doctrine is
189
exceedingly difficult to satisfy and, as we have seen, duty of care claims
mn.us/consumer/PDF/HealthPartners_Travel__Entertainment.pdf (last visited Nov. 17,
2004). See also Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 1005.
185. Brody, supra note 13, at 1005.
186. Michael Peregrine & James Schwartz, Key Nonprofit Law Developments in 2003, 13 BNA
HEALTH L. REP. 128, 130 (2004).
187. PEREGRINE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 158 (citing Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp.
v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1999) for the duty to ensure “that the mission of
the charitable corporation is carried out”). It also cites commentary summarizing directors’
general fiduciary duties under nonprofit corporate law, e.g., KURTZ, supra note 140
(“[D]irectors should be diligent and attentive.”), but makes no reference to the business
judgment rule. Id.
188. Commentators have sharply questioned whether theories of corporate waste or
breach of fiduciary duty can be brought in instances of director nonfeasance such as
HealthPartners petition. See PEREGRINE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 158, at 26-27.
189. Under Delaware law, “waste entails an exchange of corporate assets for
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any
reasonable person might be willing to trade.” Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del.
Ch. 1997) (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988)); see also Saxe v. Brady,
184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962). This extraordinarily high standard of proof has led some
courts to doubt it can ever be met absent proof of self dealing. Steiner v. Meyerson, No. Civ.
A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995) (“But rarest of all—and
indeed, like Nessie, possibly nonexistent—would be the case of disinterested business
people making non- fraudulent deals (non-negligently) that meet the legal standard of
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are easy defended by invoking the business judgment rule.
The doctrinal and policy flaws of borrowing the charitable trust
standard are discussed in Part IV. However, two important collateral
aspects of attorney general activism in the face of doctrinal uncertainty in
this area should be noted. As discussed in Part II, one highly controversial
aspect of Allina was the relief obtained by the Minnesota Attorney
General—a spin off of the HMO subsidiary. As troubling, however, was the
Attorney General’s petition for authority to select eight of the special
administrators who were to serve as the new entity’s board. He sought this
same power to appoint directors, first informally and later with court
approval, in the HealthPartners case (ultimately the probate division of the
district court ordered that one be appointed special administrator with
190
responsibilities to report instances of board failure to act in good faith).
The state’s attempt to substitute its own decision-makers for the directors
of the nonprofit corporation does considerable violence to the
independence of the nonprofit sector. The problems associated with this
intervention go beyond the merits of the claimed failures of the current
board. The threat of direct intervention by politically-selected regulators
191
blurs the line between public and private. If not reserved for instances of
outright corruption, the power to replace decision-makers may be too
potent a weapon to entrust to courts, especially when attorneys general
may accomplish the result by the mere threat of seeking judicial relief.
D. The Misuse or Neglect of Mission in Analyzing Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
Finally, we consider the curiously neglected role of institutional
mission in informing directors’ duties. Conversions, closures, asset sales,
and other organic changes involving nonprofit corporations require
directors’ most assiduous adherence to their fiduciary duties. Fiduciary
questions arise in many contexts, including whether the conversion or
change of purpose is consistent with the purpose of the nonprofit
organization; whether the purchaser is appropriate in view of the entity’s
charitable purposes; whether directors approving the decision resolved

waste!”).
190. In re HealthPartners, Inc., No. MC 03-001587 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Prob. Div. June 10,
2003) (stipulation and order for the appointment of a Special Administrator).
191. Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 942. Further, some have inferred political
impropriety in elected officials’ appointment of some special administrators or board
members. See Strom, supra note 92 (raising concerns about politicians’ appointment of
friends, colleagues and political contributors, and quoting experts who suggest that such
appointments are more appropriately made by courts).
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conflicts of interest; and how the directors decided to use the assets
acquired by the nonprofit corporation. Though these questions would
seem to force regulatory agencies and courts to confront directly the role
of mission in nonprofit corporate decision-making, the standard to be
applied remains muddled. Arising in different statutory contexts, and
often applying different substantive standards, the case law presents a less
than uniform picture. Three approaches can be discerned in the case law:
the pure corporate law standard; the mixed corporate/nonprofit mission
standard; and the corporate/regulatory policy standard. None, however,
offers a coherent formula for accommodating mission values into the
fiduciary duties of directors.
1. Pure Corporate Standard
In a number of cases, courts confronting organic changes have
purported to apply the corporate fiduciary standard in reviewing directors’
decisions. For example, in Health Midwest, the court declared unequivocally
192
“corporate law applies to all aspects of this transaction.” In so doing, it
declined to apply the Kansas cy pres statute to the transaction, finding that
193
the statute did not apply to changes in corporate purposes. Applying the
corporate standard in a straightforward fashion, it went on to hold that the
business judgment rule required deference to the board’s decision to
convert, its choice of a buyer, and its evaluation of an appropriate sales
price. Likewise, it summarily rejected a challenge to executive
194
compensation arrangements for executives involved in the transaction.
However, despite its invocation of a pure corporate standard, the Health
Midwest court could not resist invoking mission-related obligations in
reviewing one financially important (and parochial) aspect of the board’s
decision. The Kansas court struck down the board’s decision to pay the sale

192. Health Midwest v. Kline, No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 6,
2003) (citing United Methodist Church v. Bethany Med. Ctr., 969 P.2d 859 (1998)); see also
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1987).
193. Health Midwest, 2003 WL 328845, at *19 (“The Kansas cy pres statute governs
changes to the purposes of charitable trusts, devises and bequests. The cy pres statute does
not apply to changes to the purposes of nonprofit corporations. The cy pres statute applies
only to any restricted gifts and not the entity as a whole. No restricted gifts have been
identified herein and therefore the cy pres statute does not apply.” (citations omitted)).
194. The court observed that “[t]he appropriateness of the packages (even though they
appear on their face to be excessive) has no bearing in regard to whether the Agreement
should be approved. Health Midwest’s decision to approve the compensation is an internal
matter of the Missouri company and is subject to review by a Missouri court.” Id. at *19.
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proceeds into a Missouri foundation, noting that the board had elsewhere
concluded that twenty percent of Health Midwest’s assets had previously
served Kansas residents. The court made no effort to explain why
corporate law analysis including the business judgment rule did not
mandate judicial abstention here, except to suggest rather obliquely that
195
mission factors compelled the result.
2. Mixed Corporate/Nonprofit Mission Standard
Some courts have more explicitly weighed mission responsibilities in
interpreting nonprofit directors’ fiduciary duties. For example, in MEETH
the court invoked the duty of obedience to buttress its conclusions that the
hospital directors had neglected their obligation to fully consider all
options for avoiding closure of the hospital and had not received adequate
196
value in the sale of its assets. Yet, the court gave little deference to the
judgment of the directors and in fact never mentioned the business
judgment rule in reviewing the merits of the decision to “monetize the
assets” of MEETH for use in what the directors regarded as a more needed
and financially viable charitable use. Nor did it explain how the Board was
to go about weighing mission and business responsibilities. Similarly, in
Queen of Angels, the court was willing to override the business judgment of
the hospital board where it interpreted the nonprofit corporation’s
mission as commanding unwavering allegiance to the continued operation

195. The court stated:
The attorney general . . . has persuaded the Court that the decision to merge into
a Missouri Foundation is a “perversion of corporate purpose” and that the Kansas
boards have neglected their duties to the communities in their service areas and
have breached the trust placed in them. The announced foundation plan does
not confirm that Health Midwest’s Kansas subsidiaries’ historic charitable
purposes will remain intact following the transaction.
Id. at *26.
196. The court noted:
It is axiomatic that the Board of Directors is charged with the duty to ensure that
the mission of charitable corporation is carried out. This . . . “duty of obedience”
. . . requires the director of a not-for-profit corporation to be “be faithful to the
purposes and goals of the organization,” since “[u]nlike business corporations,
whose ultimate objective is to make money, nonprofit corporations are defined
by their specific objectives: perpetuation of particular activities are central to the
raison d’etre of the organization.”
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 593 (Sup. Ct. 1999)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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of a hospital.

3. Corporate/Regulatory Policy Standard
Perhaps the most confusing analysis of mission is found in the
regulatory context. In its evaluation of the conversion and sale of CareFirst
to WellPoint Health Networks, the Maryland Insurance Commissioner
applied a multi-pronged regulatory standard to determine whether the
198
transaction satisfied the statute’s broad public interest criteria. The
statute gives the Commissioner broad discretion to determine what
constitutes due diligence, setting forth eight criteria that may be brought
199
to bear. As discussed above, the Commissioner’s decision at times
invoked for-profit fiduciary standards and at others rejected them. Indeed,
in one passage, the opinion considered a particularly rigid application of
the for-profit standard, inquiring whether the directors of CareFirst had an
obligation to accept the highest bid and thus were bound to ignore
mission-based considerations in selecting a buyer. Under for-profit
corporate law in many states, the Revlon doctrine obligates fiduciaries to act
as a broker and accept the highest bid, once the decision to sell is
200
definitive.
While application of this rule to nonprofits would be
controversial, strict application of corporate fiduciary standards might
suggest that in a change of control transaction, a nonprofit board is bound
to opt for the best financial offer even though another bidder may offer
nonfinancial terms more in keeping with the mission of the nonprofit
201
corporation. Although special counsel vigorously supported applying the

197. Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 41 (1977).
198. The CareFirst decision is discussed supra notes 117-126 and accompanying text; see
CAREFIRST CONVERSION INFORMATION, supra note 117, at 5-7.
199. See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
200. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985)
(holding that once the board of a target company of a takeover bid “no longer faced threats
to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders’ interests,” their role “changed
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price
for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”).
201. In change-of-control transactions, the nonprofit board may seek to achieve
nonfinancial objectives. For example it may wish to obtain “capital improvement
commitments, access to acute care commitments, preservation of workforce, and
preservation of employee benefits.” Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 179, at 199. For an
argument in favor of applying Revlon to nonprofits, see Colin T. Moran, Why Revlon Applies
to Nonprofit Corporations, 53 BUS. LAW. 373 (1998).
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Revlon Rule, the Maryland Insurance Commissioner concluded it did not
need to decide the issue as it found the director’s conduct wanting for
failure to exercise “due diligence.”
In other passages, the opinion departed sharply from for-profit
fiduciary principles. For example, acknowledging that courts employ the
business judgment rule in cases involving directors’ breach of the duty of
care, the Commissioner announced that the presumption did not apply in
202
a regulatory context. The opinion deemed the business judgment rule
inapposite in an administrative proceeding governed by a broad regulatory
mandate. Thus, the Commissioner concluded he had broad latitude to
conduct his own de novo review of whether a transaction is in the public’s
interest.
IV. THE ELUSIVE SLIDE FROM A
FIDUCIARY TO CHARITABLE TRUST STANDARD
Part III establishes that the strict importation of for-profit corporate
law principles and applying mixed for-profit and nonprofit mission or
regulatory policy standards is inefficacious in the nonprofit health care
enterprise context. This Part argues that the invocation of charitable trust
principles, either directly or implicitly, is fundamentally unsound. It
contends, first, that doctrinal developments militate strongly against
applying charitable trust standards except where an express trust exists.
Although some states have chosen to buck the trend and retain a broad
charitable trust standard for their nonprofits, courts and attorneys general
should take care to recognize that those are sui generis cases owing to their
statutory law. Further, there is no reason to believe that these states’
approaches advance sound public health care policy.
Next we argue that conceptually, charitable trust law, which assumes
an identifiable settlor, beneficiaries, and trust purpose, is ill-suited to the
nonprofit corporation. We also find that in stretching the law governing
charitable trusts beyond recognition, attorneys general have undertaken a
wholly impractical and ad hoc course. There are reasons to believe that
rigid application of charitable trust principles will undermine sound health
policy aimed at maintaining a health care delivery system sufficient to meet
the nation’s needs. By the same token, these efforts make it impossible for
nonprofit boards to have any clear sense of what power they have to direct
the corporate mission in a way that is market-responsive, or to deploy assets
consistent with a long-term strategic plan.

202. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Finally, we conclude that by blending charitable trust and corporate
fiduciary law in their oversight of nonprofit board decision-making,
attorneys general and other charity regulators have opportunistically
capitalized on doctrinal confusion in this area. While acknowledging that
corporate law requires some development to regulate the nonprofit sector
well, we conclude that it is unquestionably the better doctrinal starting
point. Specifically, nonprofit corporate doctrine should explicitly
recognize the centrality of mission to the charitable enterprise, and
presume that directors are best situated, at least in the first instance, to
advance the corporation’s mission. Recognition of directors’ superior
expertise and dedication to mission preservation would hopefully
ameliorate the trends described in this Article that counter policies
uniquely important in the health care sector and that may have a particular
deleterious impact on long-term access to appropriate health care in many
communities. That is, by inappropriately interfering with directors’
responsibility to balance mission and margin, the vibrant and creative
impact of the health care sector may be seriously impeded. Further, it may
hamper the efficient reorientation of segments of the sector, such as
redeployment of charitable assets and conversion to for-profit form.
Finally, by broadly invoking various policy concerns that implicate federal
tax law, state licensure and access statutes, and health care fraud law in
their state law analyses, attorneys general usurp power, distort policy, and
subject entities to inconsistent application of these laws.
A. The Impact of the Adoption of Modern Nonprofit Statutes
Approximately twenty-nine states have adopted all or part of the
203
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (RMNCA) or its predecessor.
In retrospect, it seems surprising that the RMNCA does not more helpfully
address the issues associated with the most distinctive aspect of the
charitable corporation, its nonprofit mission. Like most nonprofit statutes,
it requires that a nonprofit corporation have a public benefit, religious, or
204
mutual benefit purpose. At the same time, most states adopting modern
nonprofit statutes are relatively clear that corporate law standards generally
apply in these matters. Problems arise, however, because the RMNCA and
most state nonprofit acts do not address the extent to which public benefit,
203. The original model act was adopted in 1942, but did not address directors’ duties;
the revised model act was adopted in 1987. See James Edward Harris, The Nonprofit
Corporation Act of 1993: Considering the Election To Apply the New Law to Old Corporations, 16 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 1, 3 n.11 (1994).
204. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 2.02(a)(2) (1987).
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mutual benefit, and religious purposes may alter the frame of analysis
applied by directors in exercising their fiduciary duties or by courts in
205
assessing their conduct. As we have seen, this gap has been only
episodically addressed by courts and has invited attorney general activism
in the form of transporting charitable trust law to fill the void. It should be
noted that a few states, such as Illinois, New Hampshire, and Virginia, have
gone in an entirely different direction, enacting statutes that explicitly
impose a charitable trust upon the property of nonprofit corporations.
While this approach unquestionably gives courts and attorneys general
clear and significant authority over mission decisions by nonprofit boards,
the law of other states should not be read to vest such discretion. We survey
and analyze below the state statutory approaches to the issue.
1. Model Nonprofit Corporation Act States
Most states apply corporate law principles to charitable corporations,
either by judge-made law or the adoption of all or part of the Model
206
Nonprofit Corporation Act.
This “modern trend” of significantly

205. Mission is little addressed by either the Model Act or the common law. It has long
been assumed that a board may alter its mission by amending its articles of incorporation.
The process is rather uncomplicated; the Revised Model Act provides that a “corporation
may amend its articles of incorporation at any time to add or change a provision that is
required or permitted in the articles or to delete a provision not required in the articles.”
Id. § 10.01. Nowhere is it suggested that such amendments may not affect the corporate
purposes.
206. The following states’ nonprofit corporate statutes are based upon the Model Act
adopted in 1964: ALA. CODE §§ 10-3A-1 to -225 (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.20.005 (Michie
2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-3301 to -3304 (West 2004); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5510–27
(West 1990) ; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-123-101 to -137-204 (1999); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29301.01 to -321.01. (2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-101 to -1703 (Harrison 2003); 805 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 105/101.01- 105/101.80 (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 504A.1- .101 (West 1999);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.070- .991 (Michie 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13B, §§ 101-110
(West 1981); MINN. STAT. §§ 317A.001- .909 (2004); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 355.001- .881 (2001);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-113 to -1402 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-1901 to -19,177 (1997);
NEV. REV. STAT. 82.006- .546 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-8-1 to -99 (Michie 2001); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 55A-1-01 to -17-05 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-33-01 to -147 (2003); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 65.001- .990 (2003); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5101-6145 (WEST 1995); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 47-22-1 to -78 (Michie 2000); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. X § 1396-1.01
to 1396-11.01 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 16-6a-101 to 16-6a-304 (2001); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11B, §§ 1.01- 17.05 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 24.03.005- .925 (1994); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 31E-1-101 to -15-1520 (Michie 2003); WIS. STAT. §§ 181.0103- 1703 (2002). The
following states’ statutes are based upon the 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
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displacing trust law with corporate law was famously articulated in Stern v.
207
Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School:
The charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity which does not
fit neatly into the established common law categories of corporation and
trust. . . . [T]he modern trend is to apply corporate rather than trust
principles in determining the liability of the directors of charitable
corporations, because their functions are virtually indistinguishable from
208
those of their “pure” corporate counterparts.

As we have seen, a number of more recent opinions like Health Midwest
have followed Stern and applied the corporate standard rejecting
categorical attempts to import charitable trust law to guide evaluations of
directors’ decisions:
The Kansas cy pres statute governs changes to the purposes of charitable
trusts, devises and bequests. The cy pres statute does not apply to changes
to the purposes of nonprofit corporations. The cy pres statute applies
only to any restricted gifts and not the entity as a whole (citation
omitted). No restricted gifts have been identified herein and therefore
209
the cy pres statute does not apply.

Consistent with the common law trend, the Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act of 1987 adopted virtually the same fiduciary duty standard
210
applicable to business corporations and specifically rejected the stricter

Act: MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-11-101 to -529 (2001); and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-51-101 to -68105 (2002). See also Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 179, at 192.
207. 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
208. Id. at 1013. As far back as 1967, a New Jersey court observed that the hospital was a
charitable corporation, governed by the law applicable to charitable corporations which is
rooted partially “in the law of trusts, to some extent in the law of corporations; to some
extent it may partake of both or indeed be sui generis.” Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp., 235
A.2d 487, 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). Thus, although the court did not say that the
board had unlimited discretion to deviate from its charter, it clearly and ultimately viewed
the case as subject to the law governing nonprofit corporations, as opposed to trusts. Id. at
489. Delaware followed suit, repeatedly affirming that charitable corporations are subject to
corporate rather than trust law. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991). The court
further noted that philanthropists understand the difference between a trust and nonprofit
corporation when they make their gifts, and when they use the corporate form, they
“invoke the far more flexible and adaptable principles of corporate law.” Id.
209. Health Midwest v. Kline, No. 02-CV-08043, 2003 WL 328845, at *19 (D. Kan. Feb. 6,
2003).
210. Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act adopts the standard
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211

trust standard. Thus, for purposes of assessing liability of corporate
directors, the Revised Act and most state nonprofit corporation laws apply
212
the corporate standard discussed earlier.
It must be acknowledged that the RMNCA is not without ambiguity.
While it is clear that the Revised Act was designed to shift the standard
213
applicable to the nonprofit director from the trust to business standard,
the Act suggests the possibility that the corporation, as distinct from the
director, may continue to be subject to state common law that applies trust
214
rules to the property held by the nonprofit corporation. Several state
attorneys general have exploited this uncertainty to apply a different
standard to the regulation of the assets of nonprofit corporation, as
opposed to imposition of director liability.
That corporate law governs directors’ fiduciary duties, but trust law
would govern their power to manage charitable assets, makes little sense

of conduct almost identical to that of the Revised Model Business Act:
[D]irector shall discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her
duties as a member of a committee: (1) in good faith; (2) with the care of an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise in similar
circumstances; and (3) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the
best interest of the corporation.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1987); see Moody, supra note 134, at 275
(noting that section 8.30 “clearly settles the dispute as to whether directors of nonprofit
corporations should be held to the standard of the director of a business corporation or the
standard of a trustee”). See generally PEREGRINE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 158 (general
standard for directors of for-profit and nonprofit corporations same in almost all states).
211. Section 8.30 of the Revised Act sets for the general standards of conduct for
nonprofit board directors: A director shall not be deemed to be a trustee with respect to the
corporation or with respect to any property held or administered by the corporation,
including without limit, property that may be subject to restrictions imposed by the donor
or transferor of such property. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(e) (1987).
212. See generally Peregrine & Schwartz, supra note 179, at 185 (explaining that the
Revised Model Act tracks directors’ duties articulated in the Model Business Corporation
Act).
213. See 1 MARILYN E. PHELAN, NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES: CORPORATIONS, TRUSTS AND
ASSOCIATIONS § 4:02 (2000).
214. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT, § 8.30 cmt. 1 (1987). Several states that have
substantially adopted the Revised Act have not adopted 8.30(e), thereby leaving open the
question of how the relationship between statutory and common law applies to the
nonprofit director. Some commentators advance this interpretation as well. See Frost, supra
note 177, at 946; Singer, supra note 68, at 237; cf. 1 PHELAN, supra note 213, § 4:02 (“The
charitable corporation is a relatively new legal entity that does not fit neatly into the
established common-law categories of corporation or trust.”).
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doctrinally or analytically. The drafters of the Model Act clearly intended
to recognize nonprofits as corporations, and to regulate them as such.
While the corporate law model has its deficiencies, it is unquestionably
superior, both analytically and practically, to a charitable trust approach to
governing nonprofits. States can more easily tailor corporate law to the
unique aspects of the nonprofit sector either statutorily or, for example, by
differently articulating the business judgment rule. Because only a handful
of states had common law one way or the other addressing the relationship
of trust law to the assets of nonprofit corporations before the enactment of
nonprofit corporate statutes, clarifying the law should not be difficult.
Most state courts facing this issue today are doing so for the first time. The
corporate standard of governance facilitates the articulation of clear
parameters within which nonprofit boards may alter the corporate mission,
which power is essential to the functioning of commercial not-for-profits.
This result is consistent with the comments to the Revised Model Act,
which merely leave open the possibility that trust law would still apply to
charitable assets.
2. Nonprofit Corporate Law and Quasi-Cy Pres
New York has sought a middle ground between the corporate standard
and charitable trust law. Yet, New York law makes clear that even states that
have attempted to address the unique characteristics of the nonprofit form
have not avoided activism by the attorney general or confusing guidance
from the courts on the scope of board autonomy to direct mission.
New York clearly subscribes to corporate law principles in the
governance of the charitable corporation. Unlike most states, however, it
also addressed the ownership and mission questions unique to the
215
charitable corporation by rejecting the concept that the assets of a

215. According to MEETH:
Not-for-profit corporations operate under legal regimes designed for traditional
for-profit corporations. However, fundamental structural differences between
not-for-profit corporations and for-profit corporations render this approach
incapable of providing effective internal mechanisms to guard against directors’
improvident use of charitable assets. For example, in the for-profit context,
shareholder power ensures that Boards make provident decisions, while in the
not-for-profit context, this internal check does not exist. To put it another way, a
nonprofit corporation has no “owners” or private parties with a pecuniary stake to
monitor and scrutinize actions by the directors.
Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 592 (Sup. Ct. 1999). Both
the attorney general and a court must be involved in the disposition of substantially all of
the nonprofit’s assets, “to ensure that the interests of the ultimate beneficiaries of the
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nonprofit that accrue from a gift are subject to a trust; requiring notice
to the attorney general, and court approval, whenever an amendment to
217
the articles of incorporation affects the corporate purposes or powers;
recognizing the duty of obedience; and treating the disposition of assets
218
upon dissolution under a process that the courts refer to as quasi-cy pres.
As conceptualized by the MEETH court, “A charitable Board is essentially a
caretaker of the not-for-profit corporation and its assets. As caretaker, the
Board ‘ha[s] the fiduciary obligation to act on behalf of the
219
corporation . . . and advance its interests.’”
Despite its attempts to affirmatively deal with the unique
characteristics of the nonprofit form, New York law fails to articulate a
clear definition of mission or the extent to which the board may alter the
nature of the nonprofit’s business while still remaining faithful to that
mission. Consequently, courts’ conflicting signals about the scope of the
attorney general’s power over charities has created uncertainty for
nonprofit boards. For example, the MEETH board asserted that its
strategic plan was not a new or different mission, and consequently sought
to implement its planned transition to out-patient services without
amending its articles of incorporation; this approach dispensed with any
requirement of obtaining court approval of a change in purpose. The
court disagreed with MEETH’s view on the scope of its mission, of course,
corporation, the public, are adequately represented and protected from improvident
transactions.” Id. Further, the MEETH court observed that the legislature imposed a higher
standard of care upon the director of the nonprofit. Id. at 593.
216. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 513(a) (McKinney 1997). Subsection b adds:
“Except as may be otherwise permitted under article eight of the estates, powers and trusts
law or section 522 (Release of restrictions on use or investment), the governing board shall
apply all assets thus received to the purposes specified in the gift instrument.” Id. § 513(b).
The legislative history elucidates: “‘[t]he board is under a duty to apply such funds in
accordance with the directions of the donor, but within the framework of the corporation
law rather than the trust law.’” Alco Gravure v. Knapp Found., 490 N.Y.S.2d 116, 121 n.7
(1985) (quoting Memorandum of the Joint Legislative Committee to Study Revision of
Corporation Laws (Jan. 13, 1969)).
217. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 804 (a)(ii) (McKinney 1997).
218. See Gravure v. Knapp Found., 64 N.Y.2d 458, 474-76 (1985) (summarizing the
legislative history of the 1969 statute). The quasi-cy pres concept is embodied in N.Y. NOTFOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 1005(a)(3)(A) (2002) (addressing the distribution of the assets of a
nonprofit undergoing dissolution). See also In re Thurston, 746 N.Y.S.2d 343, 346 (Sur. Ct.
2002) (explaining how quasi-cy pres concept works in the nonprofit corporate context).
219. Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 593 (citing Pebble Cove
Homeowners’ Assoc., Inc. v. Shoreatlantic Dev. Co., 595 N.Y.S.2d 92 (1993)) (alteration in
original).
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but more troubling is that the court’s analysis fails to guide other
charitable corporations making significant changes that arguably fall
within the original mission.
220
The MEETH court also invoked the duty of obedience, declaring that
“the duty of obedience, perforce, must inform the question of whether a
proposed transaction to sell all or substantially all of a charity’s assets
promotes the purposes of the charitable corporation when analyzed under
221
section 511.” The court treated the proposed MEETH transaction as
analogous to a conversion, “inasmuch as in both there is a charitable
organization which alleges that it is incapable of continuing its primary
mission of operating a hospital, seeks approval of the sale of all its assets,
222
and plans to apply the sale proceeds towards a newly revised mission.” In
applying the duty of obedience, the court characterized its role as ensuring
that nonprofit boards are “faithful to the purposes and goals of the
organization”—nonprofits are not ultimately about making money, but
about the “perpetuation of [the] particular activities [that] are central to
223
the raison d’être of the organization.” The court also held that the duty
of obedience mandates that the board depart from its core mission only as
224
a “last resort.” While this court’s interpretation of the duty of obedience
seems more liberal than that embodied by charitable trust law, it certainly
was not so in application to the facts of the MEETH case, and resulted in a
225
much different outcome than Littauer, which did not invoke the duty of
obedience.
Quasi-cy pres is also intended to ensure fidelity to mission, by requiring
boards to dispose of charitable assets upon dissolution to entities that will
subscribe to the dissolving corporation’s original purpose. As interpreted
by New York’s highest court, quasi-cy pres is less restrictive than the
charitable trust cy pres concept. It:
accords greater authority to the corporation’s board of directors
and the courts than governs the distribution of the assets held by a
trustee under a will or other instrument making a disposition for
charitable purposes . . . or than was the cy pres standard at

220. According to the MEETH court, the duty of obedience had only been previously
raised in breach of duty situations, and never in the context of the sale of assets. 715
N.Y.S.2d at 593.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 593.
224. Id. at 595.
225. Nathan Littauer Hosp. Ass’n v. Spitzer, 287 A.D.2d 202 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
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common law (“as nearly as possible”).

Interestingly, however, MEETH was not dissolving. Rather, the board
sought to monetize the hospital facility to enable it to establish clinics.
Thus, the court appears to have taken some liberties in its invocation of the
cy pres doctrine. This is, of course, consistent with the trend of other states
employing charitable trust principles to strengthen their ability to secondguess nonprofit boards.
By contrast, and further confusing the matter of what constitutes a
mission change, the Littauer court held that a change in corporate
membership, which the attorney general characterized as a disposition of
227
assets, was not a change in the underlying purpose, nor the overall
228
business purpose, of the hospitals. The court observed: “Plainly, the
statute is designed to require prior court approval only in instances where
the proposed amendment truly seeks to change the nature, object or
229
powers of a particular corporation.” The court also rejected amici
arguments that a requirement of compliance with the Catholic Ethical and
Religious Directives in addition to the articles of incorporation constituted
a curtailment of corporate powers requiring judicial approval. The court
distinguished between corporate powers and purposes, and the services the
226. In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org., 68 N.Y.2d 32, 35 (1986). The Court of Appeals
further stated:
Under the quasi cy pres standard of the Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, a
Supreme Court Justice in determining whether to approve the plan of
distribution proposed by the corporation’s board, and if not to what other
charitable organizations distribution should be made, should consider (1) the
source of the funds to be distributed, whether received through public
subscription or under the trust provision of a will or other instrument; (2) the
purposes and powers of the corporation as enumerated in its certificate of
incorporation; (3) the activities in fact carried out and services actually provided
by the corporation; (4) the relationship of the activities and purposes of the
proposed distributee(s) to those of the dissolving corporation, and (5) the bases
for the distribution recommended by the board.
Id.
227. The Attorney General argued that the two hospitals’ filing of restated articles of
incorporation, which reserved certain governance and management powers for the new
corporate parent, required notice to the attorney general and court approval under N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 510 (McKinney 1997), which governs disposition of assets, and
N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 804 (McKinney 1997), which addresses changes to
corporate purposes and powers. Nathan Littauer Hosp. Ass’n v. Spitzer, 287 A.D.2d 202,
204 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
228. 287 A.D.2d at 204; see also supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 205.
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entity actually provides, stating: “the decision to delineate in a restated
certificate of incorporation a specific or potential restriction upon the
services to be provided by the corporation is not the functional equivalent
of altering the corporation’s underlying purpose or curtailing its power to
230
achieve its overall objectives.” In sum, then, the New York statute’s
attempt to regulate boards’ oversight of the nonprofit mission has, in the
courts’ hands, generated confusion without promoting attention to the
role of mission. Since charitable corporations pursuing a dynamic strategic
plan are likely to avoid court intervention, of greater relevance to the daily
operation of the charitable corporation is the wide gulf between the
attorney general’s and nonprofit sector’s concept of the scope of an
entity’s mission, and what actions comprise a change to mission requiring
judicial approval.
3.

Statutory Charitable Trust States

As noted above, Illinois and New Hampshire have long been clear in
their treatment of the nonprofit corporation—nonprofit assets are subject
231
to charitable trust by virtue of statute. Virginia has just recently joined
232
this statutory charitable trust group. This Subsection will focus its
discussion on New Hampshire, where the attorney general has asserted his
statutory charitable trust power over the health care industry quite
aggressively.
New Hampshire law specifically delineates “health care charitable
233
trusts,” to include health care providers and payors. As a result, the New

230. Id. at 207.
231. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10 cmt. b, at 198 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
The examples and illustrations included in the draft, however, are dissimilar to the
scenarios presented here. An Illinois appellate court, applying the state’s Charitable Trust
Act in Riverton Area Fire Prot. District v. Riverton Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 566 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991), held that a not-for-profit corporation held its assets as trustee of a charitable
trust; no trust documents were required to evidence the creation of the trust, rather, the
court observed, “charitable trusts are remedial and created by statute.” Id. at 1019.
232. 2002 Va. Acts. ch. 792, § 2.2-507.1 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2507.1 (Michie 2004)). The next section of the act gives the courts the same subject matter
jurisdiction over the assets of the charitable corporation as they have over the assets of a
charitable trust. Id. § 17.1-513.01 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §17.1513.01(Michie 2004)).
233. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:19-b(I)(d) (2004). Charitable organization is defined as
any entity established for the public health, other charitable purpose, or solicits for any
charitable purpose. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § II(b)(2) (Lexis Supp. 2001).
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Hampshire Attorney General’s opinion letter in Optima Health, in which he
demanded the “unmerger” of two hospitals was, in the abstract, legally
234
sound. From a public policy perspective, however, we argue against states
statutorily imposing a trust on nonprofit assets. As discussed throughout
this Article, characterizing nonprofit holdings as trust assets devalues those
assets, making it significantly more difficult for nonprofits to partner and
obtain access to affordable capital. The New Hampshire Attorney
General’s devolution of the Optima deal would certainly make any
potential affiliate think twice before partnering with an entity incorporated
in a charitable trust state. Further, it is wholly unclear whether and how the
Attorney General’s opinion accounted for the health policy questions
implicated by the hospitals’ merger.
The New Hampshire Attorney General’s response to the Optima
merger was dramatic and has become a significant example of the
potential of an attorney general to require cy pres proceedings to ensure, as
conceived by the attorney general, that the charitable corporation abides
235
by the articulated purposes of the corporation. The Optima opinion has
also become “seminal” for other states because it not only relies upon the
New Hampshire Charitable Trust Act, but also comprehensively brings
236
together charitable trust common law from across the country. For
precisely this reason, the opinion has contributed significantly to the
current doctrinal confusion regarding the application of trust law to
nonprofit assets. Optima relies upon California common law, Illinois
statutory charitable trust cases, and express charitable trust cases, without
explaining the doctrinal distinctions between the law of states that are
“statutory charitable trust states” and those that are not, or the
inapplicability of express trust cases to most nonprofit health care

234. N.H. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10. The multi-hospital merger, in its inception,
was the product of a 1994 deal between Elliot Hospital and the Catholic Medical Center
(CMC). Id.
235. Specifically, the Attorney General observed that “[a]lthough a charitable
corporation may not be governed as a trust in every respect, courts have held that the assets
of a charitable corporation are impressed with a charitable trust that restricts the use of the
assets to the defined purposes of the corporation.” N.H. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10.
236. Footnote 10 of the Attorney General’s opinion, id., is a string cite of a collection of
charitable trust cases virtually identical to footnote 7 in ROBERT A. BOISTURE & DOUGLAS N.
VARLEY, STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL’S LEGAL AUTHORITY TO POLICE THE SALES OF NONPROFIT
HOSPITALS AND HMOS (1995), http://www.volunteertrustees.org/legal.html (describing
attorneys general’s authority to use charitable trust doctrine against hospitals). These cases
are much more nuanced than either report concedes.
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providers.
Finally, Optima is a very hard case from a public policy perspective.
There is no question that the Attorney General was responding to the
community’s unhappiness with the merger, which resulted from
application of the Catholic Ethical and Religious Directives to the new
238
entity, the elimination of acute care services at one of the campuses, and
finally, Optima’s 1997 decision to affiliate with out-of-state Covenant
Health Systems, itself a Catholic multi-state hospital system. The
community also felt misled by the hospital leaders about what the
implications of the transaction would be. This is not at all atypical, and
captures why, as a doctrinal matter, questions of nonprofit ownership,
mission accountability, and satisfaction of the beneficiaries remain
unresolved. Every community wants to retain its hospital, ideally, with the
most up-to-date technology and a full panoply of services. These
aspirations are frequently inconsistent with what the providers in the
community can financially sustain, and what, from a public policy
perspective, represents a responsible allocation of resources. So, the
question becomes who dictates how the assets of the nonprofit provider
are best used—the board, the community, or some arm of the state (the
attorney general, the department of health, or a court). The Optima
opinion does not engage the full scope of these issues, and is therefore
poor precedent for their resolution.
Ultimately, Optima Health was dissolved at a cost of ten million
239
dollars, and the two hospitals returned to their original independence.
Whether the outcome was worth the price is probably impossible to ever
determine.

237. N.H. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10; cf. BOISTURE & VARLEY, supra note 236.
238. That few people seemed to understand the implications of the Ethical and Religious
Directives bolstered the Attorney General’s argument that the new entity’s mission was
unclear and inconsistent with both of the predecessor organizations. Notably, the Attorney
General expressed significant concern that, in his view, Optima was disregarding CMC’s
traditionally commitment to religious health care and was potentially violating the Ethical
and Religious Directives in its delivery of health services at the newly established acute care
facility. N.H. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 10.
239. See Julia L. Eberhart, Merger Failure: A Five-Year Journey Examined, HEALTHCARE FIN.
MGMT., Apr. 2001, at 37, 39.
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B. Attorneys General’s Attempts To Integrate Charitable Trust Doctrine with
Nonprofit Corporate Law
1. Attorneys General’s Activism
As cases discussed in this Article reveal, attorneys general who find
current law inadequate to accomplishing their goals of increased oversight
of nonprofit boards are attempting to strengthen their power with a
reinvigorated charitable trust law blended with corporate analyses
whenever possible. In most cases, the attorneys general assert that the
legislatures’ enactment of statutes clearly applying corporate principles to
nonprofits did not wholly displace pre-existing common law applying trust
principles to not-for-profits. In some instances, attorneys general have had
to import the charitable trust law upon which they are relying from other
states. We explore in this Section the attorneys general’s use, or misuse, of
common law to accomplish these ends. California common law is an
extremely important source for the proposition that the assets of a
charitable corporation comprise a charitable trust, subject to the oversight
of the state attorney general, and limited to the purposes articulated in the
240
articles of incorporation. In 1964, the California Supreme Court, in Holt
v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons directed that “charitable
contributions must be used only for the purposes for which they were
241
received in trust.” A decade later, a California appellate court precluded
Queen of Angels Hospital from closing its hospital and converting its assets
242
to the operation of health clinics. The primary purpose for which Queen
of Angels was organized, argued the attorney general, was the operation of
a hospital, and that is what it must do, as long as it remains in existence.
It is highly uncertain whether these cases remain good law in
California. In 1980, California adopted a nonprofit corporate act, which
became the model for the ABA’s Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
243
Act. In so doing, the California legislature applied corporate fiduciary
duties to nonprofit directors, and, like New York, incorporated some
charitable trust concepts with respect to nonprofit corporate assets.
Whether the California statute occupies the entire field of nonprofit
governance, or whether some vestiges of the pre-1980 common law remain

240.
241.
242.
243.

See, e.g., Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36, 39 (Ct. App. 1977).
394 P.2d 932, 935 (Cal. 1964).
Queen of Angels Hosp., 136 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT (1987).
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viable, is an unanswered question in California. This question is not
unique to California, of course. The relevance of trust-based common law
after a state’s enactment of a nonprofit corporate statute must be
considered in every state.
Taking advantage of the doctrinal ambiguity, attorneys general have
argued four different cases for subjecting the assets of a nonprofit hospital
corporation to a charitable trust: that assets acquired from general
donations are subject to a trust; that assets intermingled with acquisitions
resulting from general donations cannot by separated, thereby
necessitating that all of the charities’ assets be subject to a trust; that a
consequence of tax exemption is the imposition of a trust on the
nonprofit’s assets; and that restricted gifts are subject to a trust. Only the
last of which, restricted gifts, finds support in the doctrine of traditional
trust law. Restricted gifts comprise what is generally understood to be
charitable trust property, irrespective of whether the donor uses the
245
designation “charitable trust”: The donor gives money or property for a
very specific articulated use by the corporate recipient. The property is
246
247
with the corporation as trustee.
Thus, it is
subject to a trust,
uncontroversial that if a nonprofit hospital corporation is sold, converts, or
dissolves, it must treat separately any trust property it received during its
existence, ensuring that in its capacity as trustee, it is faithful to the
settlor’s intent.
The disputes between states and hospitals arise from attorneys
general’s use of charitable trust law more expansively, by asserting that all
of the assets of the nonprofit corporation are subject to a trust. This

244. Our thanks to James Schwartz for helping us sort through the morass that California
law appears to be to a New Yorker.
245. Property held by a charitable corporation is subject to a charitable trust most
typically when the donor attaches conditions to a gift. “A disposition to [a hospital or
university] for a specific purpose, such as to support medical research, perhaps on a
particular disease, or to establish a scholarship fund in a certain field of study, creates a
charitable trust of which the institution is the trustee for purposes of the terminology and
rules of this Restatement.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
246. In New York, pursuant to the not-for-profit corporate statute, the corporation would
not become a trustee or be subject to charitable trust law, but corporate law. Nonetheless, if
the corporation receives a gift with conditions, or that uses trust language, it is bound by
the intentions of the donor, unless it undergoes a quasi-cy pres proceeding. See Alco Gravure,
Inc. v. Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752, 757 n.7 (N.Y. 1985).
247. The members of the board of directors are not trustees, in the strict sense, however,
because they do not hold title to the property of the corporation. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 5 cmt. g (2003).
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assertion takes three different forms, none of which charitable trust law
supports. The first form of the argument posits that whatever is acquired
by general donations to the hospital becomes property subject to a trust
because donors expected and understood that their gifts would be used for
248
and by the recipient hospital.
This argument is wrong; outright
donations to a charity, particularly those solicited in connection with a
campaign or fund-raising event, simply do not satisfy the prerequisites for
249
the establishment of a trust. A slight variant of this first argument is that
the assets owned by a charitable corporation with restrictions on use
articulated in its articles of incorporation are subject to a constructive
250
charitable trust, protecting them from a non-compliant use. Though not

248. See, e.g., Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 247 (S.D. 2003). In Banner
Health, although the court rejected the Attorney General’s argument that an implied
charitable trust resulted from donations made to support the corporation’s general
purposes, it did recognize the possibility of a constructive trust if “Banner was unjustly
enriched by the sale of the assets and removal of the proceeds from the local communities
at the expense of those communities . . . .” Id. at 248. The court then suggested that if
indeed the facts support the finding of a constructive charitable trust, the directors could
be in breach of their fiduciary duties for having used the trust property in a manner adverse
to the interests of the beneficiaries. Id. at 249; see also supra notes 99-107 and accompanying
text.
249. See, e.g., Nat’l Found. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 F.2d 831, 834, 836 (4th Cir. 1961)
(finding that donations made to a local chapter of National Foundation in response to a
general appeal did not constitute a charitable trust to the local chapter, but rather were an
unrestricted gift to National Foundation); Persan v. Life Concepts, Inc., 738 So. 2d 1008
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (making a gift to a charity for a specific purpose does not create a
charitable trust; creation of trust must be express, with intent established beyond a
reasonable doubt); United Methodist Church v. Bethany Med. Ctr., 969 P.2d 859 (Kan.
1998) (not a case where originating donor created a trust but rather a situation where five
Methodists incorporated for the purpose of collecting donations for a hospital but no single
donor, including the church, acted as a trust settlor); see also 76 AM. JUR. 2D § 141 (2004).
This outcome is consistent with the Restatement of Trusts: “An outright devisee or donation
to a nonproprietary hospital or university or other charitable institution, expressly or
impliedly to be used for its general purposes, is charitable but does not create a trust as that
term is used in this Restatement.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003).
The distinction between a trust and an unrestricted gift is controlled by the intention of the
donor to impose enforceable duties upon the recipient. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D § 120 (2004); see
also Eychaner v. Gross, 747 N.E.2d 969 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (resolving dispute as to whether
university evidenced intent to place in trust with theater council either theater building or
intangible interests in maintaining the theatre), rev’d, 779 N.E.2d 1115 (Ill. 2002).
250. See, e.g., Banner, 663 N.W.2d at 250. This result occurs from a convoluted
combination of trust and statutory analysis, and depends upon a finding that non-members’
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doctrinally grounded, the rationale advanced for this position is not
unappealing: that “[a]ny other rule of law would allow a charitable
nonprofit corporation to eviscerate the charitable purpose for which it was
251
formed without recourse for those who donated funds for that purpose.”
A response to this argument is that a donor committed to the perpetual
mission of her designated charity might have protected her intent by
creating a trust; that she did not subjects her to the risk of a charitable
board taking the entity in a new direction.
The second argument in favor of imposing a charitable trust on the
entire assets of a nonprofit corporation assumes that, because it is
impossible to separate out assets acquired from general fund-raising
(which are wrongly designated trust assets by this analysis) from non252
donated assets, all assets must be treated as subject to a trust. The adage
that “two wrongs don’t make a right” comes to mind. Third, attorneys
general posit that nonprofit hospital assets that are under-written by the
government through tax exemptions and payments by government health
253
plans should be subject to a trust. This sweeping approach is free-floating
social policy masquerading as trust law.
The attorneys general in North Dakota, South Dakota, and New
Mexico all attempted to use charitable trust principles to block Banner’s
removal of the proceeds from Banner’s liquidation of its assets in their
respective states. Recall that Banner is a multi-state health care system that
sold its holdings in North Dakota, South Dakota and New Mexico so that it

rights are affected by the elimination of the restrictions. Id. at 248-49. Such would unlikely
succeed in a state whose nonprofit corporate statute does not resemble North Dakota’s.
251. Id. at 250.
252. This “implied trust” argument is also explained as a “base capital” concept—that the
originally donated assets facilitated the generation of other assets or value, such that the
entire body must be subject to trust. See Coffey et al., supra note 102, at 4. A Massachusetts
case represents a situation where the hospital was originally founded as a result of a trust
and whose assets were later indistinguishable from subsequent gifts. Att’y Gen. v.
Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1021 (Mass. 1986) (finding that where assets of a
charitable trust dedicated to the operation of homeopathic hospitals are so intertwined with
other hospital funds, the board would violate fiduciary duties if it dedicated funds from the
trust, or funds donated prior to the change in corporate purpose by donees who
understood the purpose to be governed by the trust, to a new purpose).
253. See Horwitz, supra note 5, at 1347; see also Coffey et al., supra note 102, at 5
(observing that the South Dakota Supreme Court did not address the contention that the
taxes not paid by the hospitals enable them to enhance their value). The North Dakota trial
court rejected the argument that by accepting tax benefits, a nonprofit corporation
converted to a charitable trust. Id.
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could concentrate its operations in and around Colorado and Arizona.
The attorneys general sought to limit Banner’s ability to liquidate its
holdings and move the proceeds by establishing the existence of a
constructive or implied trust. They relied on two now familiar arguments:
first, that the donations, and possibly the entirety of the hospital’s assets,
particularly from local citizens, were intended for the community hospital,
and not the larger corporation, and therefore created a trust for the
benefit of the community; second, that the tax benefits obtained through
the hospitals’ exemption created a trust of which taxpayers are the
beneficiaries—otherwise, unjust enrichment would result from the
hospitals’ retention of the value of the benefits accruing from tax
254
forgiveness.
In the only case that actually produced a court opinion, the attorney
general of South Dakota convinced the South Dakota Supreme Court to
integrate charitable trust law with the state’s nonprofit corporation act,
producing a legal precedent which is doctrinally flawed and impossible to
apply. While the South Dakota Supreme Court agreed that nonprofits are
subject to the state’s nonprofit corporate statute, it also held that the
255
corporate statute did not supersede the law of charitable trusts. Thus, the
court concluded that it may be necessary to impose a constructive
256
charitable trust on the hospital assets to protect donors. Finally, the court
suggested that if the attorney general could establish that Banner was in a
fiduciary relationship with the various communities it served, pursuant
either to trust law or the general common law governing fiduciary
relationships, Banner’s decision to sell its facilities may have breached its
257
duties as a fiduciary.
The South Dakota Supreme Court correctly rejected any possibility
258
that charitable corporate assets are subject to an express trust —the
254. See id.
255. Banner Health, 663 N.W.2d at 247. The court specifically sought to preserve the
relevance of the following statutory language preserving a court’s ability to employ the
implied trust device when equity so requires:
The enumeration in §§ 55-1-7 to 55-1-10, inclusive, of cases wherein an implied
trust arises does not exclude or prevent the arising of an implied trust in other
cases nor prevent a court of equity from establishing and declaring an implied,
resulting, or constructive trust in other cases and instances pursuant to the
custom and practice of such courts.
Id. at 246-47 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-1-11 (Michie 2004)).
256. Id. at 249.
257. Id.
258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 (2003) provides that a trust may be created for
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specific elements of an express trust are absent.
Without further
explication, the Supreme Court recognized the possibility of an implied
trust “based on theories of unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duties,
and improper amendment of the charitable corporation’s articles of
260
incorporation.”
This outcome is unsupported by precedent. The
261
imposition of a charitable trust as a result of tax-exemption and fundraising finds no support in charitable trust doctrine. The literature states
262
that charitable trusts result only from express and not implied trusts.
Further, the law has been clear that unrestricted charitable donations do
263
not create a trust; donations to hospitals, particularly those solicited in
connection with a campaign or fund-raising event, do not satisfy the

private or charitable purposes, or a combination thereof. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 372 (1959) provides that “[a] trust for the promotion of health is charitable.” See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(d) (2003). For an historic overview of the
development of the legal recognition and treatment of charitable trusts in the United
States, see Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and Self-Interested
Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1098-1133 (2001).
259. Property held by a charitable corporation is subject to a charitable trust most
typically when the donor attaches conditions to a gift, whether or not she explicitly
designates that it be held as a charitable trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 13 (2003)
(“The manifestation of intention requires an external expression of intention as
distinguished from undisclosed intention. There may, however, be a sufficient
manifestation of intention to create a trust without communication of that intention to the
beneficiary or to the trustee or any third person.”). By virtue of the restrictions, the donee
corporation becomes the trustee obliged to ensure that the property is devoted to the
specified purposes. The members of the board of directors are not trustees, in the strict
sense, however, because they do not hold title to the property of the corporation. Id. § 5
cmt. g. “A disposition to [a hospital or university] for a specific purpose, however, such as to
support medical research, perhaps on a particular disease, or to establish a scholarship fund
in a certain field of study, creates a charitable trust of which the institution is the trustee for
purposes of the terminology and rules of this Restatement.” Id. § 28.
260. Banner Health, 663 N.W.2d at 248. South Dakota’s nonprofit corporate statute is
unremarkable; it allows amendments to the articles “in any and as many respects as may be
desired,” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-22-14 (Michie 2004), so long as “[n]o amendment to the
articles of incorporation shall affect any existing cause of action in favor of or against such
corporation, or any pending action to which such corporation shall be a party, or the existing
rights of persons other than members,” id. § 47-22-22 (emphasis added in Banner Health, 663
N.W.2d at 249).
261. See, e.g., Hughes v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 158 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. 1942); Levin v. Sinai
Hosp., 46 A.2d 298 (Md. 1946).
262. See, e.g., Coffey et al., supra note 102, at 4.
263. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.

71

1 ART_BOOZANG

12/23/2004 4:30 PM

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

V:1 (2005)

264

prerequisites for a trust. This analysis is consistent with the Restatement
of Trusts: “[a]n outright devisee or donation to a nonproprietary hospital
or university or other charitable institution, expressly or impliedly to be
used for its general purposes, is charitable but does not create a trust as
265
that term is used in this Restatement.”
The South Dakota Supreme Court accepted an extremely complicated
analysis that provides literally no guidance to the nonprofit sector as to the
circumstances that may give rise to a charitable trust. For multi-state
nonprofit systems, even the specter that an attorney general might seize its
assets can cripple the organization by devaluing those assets and suggesting
protracted litigation to potential suitors. The reality of attorneys general’s
attempts to capture charitable assets at the very least extends the time it
takes to close any deal, and dramatically increases transaction costs,
including attorneys’ fees, which, of course, are paid from the charitable
proceeds the attorney general is seeking to preserve. These problems
increase exponentially when several attorneys general enter the fray, as
happened with Banner.
Finally, attorney general involvement with multi-state charitable
corporations raises the question of who is looking out for the national
266
public interest in the allocation of charitable resources. Large health
care systems have the financial ability to sustain the rural or urban hospital
that struggles to break even each year, has limited access to affordable
financing, and lacks the resources to invest in the capital necessary to stay
current with the technology required to survive in the current health care
market.

264. See, e.g., Nat’l Found. v. First Nat’l Bank, 288 F.2d 831, 834, 836 (4th Cir. 1961)
(finding donations made to the local chapter of the National Foundation in response to a
general appeal is not a charitable trust to local chapter but an unrestricted gift to National
Foundation); United Methodist Church v. Bethany Med. Ctr. Inc., 969 P.2d 859 (Kan.
1998) (not a case where originating donor created a trust but rather a situation where five
Methodists incorporated for the purpose of collecting donations for a hospital but no single
donor, including the Kansas East Conference, acted as a trust settlor). See generally 15 AM.
JUR. 2D § 141 (2004).
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003).
266. See Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 968. Evelyn Brody gives substantial
thoughtful attention to Banner in her article. She notes that “In terms of the national public
interest, however, relocation could be a positive-sum game: The governing board of a
charity might determine that the overall social benefit can be increased by moving its
activities from a state with a low utility to a state with a higher one.” Id.
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2. Charitable Trust Law Is Conceptually Ill-Suited to the Nonprofit Corporation
Subjecting a commercial enterprise and its board to charitable trust
principles is strained in application and constrained in outcome.
Traditional trust standards prioritize preservation of trust assets and strict
adherence to the settlor’s intent. The duty of loyalty requires strict
267
obedience to the specifications of the trust instrument,
and
268
administration of the trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.
While several doctrines somewhat blunt the edge of charitable trust
269
requirements,
the trust standards are nonetheless exacting and
unforgiving in their insistence that trustees devote their energies selflessly
and diligently toward accomplishing the settlor’s objectives.
Further, trust law as the organizational mechanism for nonprofit
270
corporations has little to commend it. First, it is analytically ill-suited to

267. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 227 cmt. b, 228(b) (1991).
268. Although attorneys general so far have not sought to apply the trustee fiduciary
standards to the directors of charitable corporations, two of the most prominent hospital
counsel in this area, Michael Peregrine and James Schwartz, suggest that hospitals should
protect against attorneys general imposing constructive trusts upon charitable assets for fear
that the imposition of the trust fiduciary standards cannot be far behind. Peregrine &
Schwartz, supra note 179, at 193. If their prediction proves accurate, corporate rules that
subject directors to what essentially amounts to a gross negligence standard would be
replaced with a charitable trust regime of simple negligence. Id. at 192. Further, a trustee
may not engage in transactions with the trust for their personal benefit. Evelyn Brody, The
Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1419-20 (1998); see also Boyd, supra note
147, at 734-35; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. c (1991). Trustees must fully
disclose any conflicted transaction, which nonetheless must be fair and reasonable, and in
the interests of the beneficiaries. See 1 PHELAN, supra note 213, § 4:03. Corporate rules are
not nearly so strict.
269. Courts employ the doctrines of cy pres to relieve the distress to a trust whose purpose
no longer exists, or for which the means dictated by the settlor to accomplish the purposes
have become impossible. In so doing, the courts typically evaluate the degree of departure
from the original intent before approving a substitute purpose. See Greil Mem’l Hosp. v.
First Ala. Bank, 387 So. 2d 778, 781 (Ala. 1980) (finding a testamentary gift to charitable
corporation made for sole purpose of “curing and preventing tuberculosis” was a charitable
trust which assets could only be used for that purpose, despite change in treatment of TB;
abandonment of purpose caused legacy to lapse); see also Taylor v. Baldwin 247 S.W.2d 741,
750 (Mo. 1952) (holding that courts will intercede where there is a substantial departure
from the charity’s dominant purpose). Courts sometimes distinguish the trust’s purpose, to
which the trustees must adhere, from the means about which the trustees may use their
discretion, as long as it is not otherwise addressed in the charter. Id. at 756.
270. See Fishman, supra note 127, at 226-87 (explaining the distinctions between
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the organizational form of the charitable corporation. A charitable trust is
created by the grant of a settlor (the principal) to accomplish a specific
and defined benefit for the public; the trustees (agents) are charged with
fulfilling the settlor’s wishes. The typical charitable corporation, however,
has no settlor. To remedy this analytical deficiency, attorneys general are
treating taxpayers and donors as the settlors; as a result, the
donors/taxpayers become both the settlors and the beneficiaries of the
271
trust. Interestingly, no attorney general has suggested treating the
corporation itself as the settlor; this alternative is obviously unappealing to
a regulator, because it would leave the corporate board accountable to
272
itself.
Focusing on the identity of the settlor and the beneficiary understates
the analytic difficulties, however. The notion that trustees must adhere to
the settlor’s original intent is justified by the “theory that the right to
273
testation is a fundamental aspect of private property.” This rationale
simply does not apply to the means by which nonprofit corporations have
accumulated their assets. Obviously, where a donation to a hospital carries
a testator’s express restrictions as to its use, a trust is created and the
testator’s desires are respected. Typically, however, the assets of a health
care corporation have been acquired or built from myriad sources,
including the entity’s profits, bond issues, tax subsidies, governmental aid
charitable trusts and nonprofit corporations and detailing the benefits of the nonprofit
corporate form, for example with respect to governance and ability to respond to changed
circumstances).
271. Further, it is unclear precisely who the intended beneficiaries were in the cases of
some hospitals’ founding. Many Jewish hospitals, for example, were founded as much to
ensure residency placements for young Jewish doctors who were precluded from such
opportunities in most of America’s prestigious academic medical centers. PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 174 (1982). So, in many instances, the
physicians who comprise the medical staff were as much the intended beneficiaries as the
community that would constitute the hospital’s patient base.
272. Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 957.
273. Ilana H. Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes
Foundation and the Case for Conservation of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1748, 1758 (2003). Charitable trusts are exempt from the Rule Against
Perpetuities. Id. at 1763.
Allowing the trust terms to run in perpetuity produces several public costs. First,
economic costs of dead-hand control include limitations on alienability of
property, limited marketability, and a decrease in productivity of trust assets and
property. . . . Second, time and changing conditions create a risk of obsolescence
and thereby detract from the charitable efficiency of the organization.
Id. at 1763-64 (footnotes omitted).
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and unrestricted donations. Even with private property, public policy
strives to limit dead-hand control. It is simply bad policy and law to attach
gratuitous restrictions on the significant holdings of a commercial
nonprofit enterprise, particularly one that operates in a dynamic industry
such as health care. This is not to say, of course, that there are not public
policy detriments of allowing too permissive use of charitable assets.
Donors and taxpayers may be discouraged from supporting entities that do
not promise some reasonable commitment to the community good for
which the contribution was originally intended. As potentially debilitating,
donors might confer only restricted gifts, to guarantee the use to which
their support is put.
An over-arching theme is a desire to avoid the burden of adhering to
legal constructs that preclude responding to changed circumstances and
force the misuse and wasting of charitable assets. How health care is
delivered has evolved from predominantly acute care in the 1960s to
predominantly outpatient care today and will likely be comprised of
pharmaceuticals and “continuum care” tomorrow. What health care is
delivered depends upon the ever-changing demographics of the
community, including the age, education, and socio-economic status of the
population. Where health care is delivered must respond to population
shifts. Those responsible for directing the uses of the privately-held assets
that substantially comprise the U.S. health care system must have the
flexibility and autonomy to make the timely decisions necessary to respond
to these changes. On the other hand, their power should not go
unchecked.
Thus, it is no surprise that charitable trust law presents a potentially
appealing source from which to fill the legal void attorneys general face
when concerned about a nonprofit board’s deviation from its mission.
Nonetheless, trust law is ill-suited to address the myriad questions that arise
in a corporate context: Does fealty to mission require merely that the
nonprofit subscribe to a valid charitable purpose or must it assiduously and
forever adhere (absent state consent) to the mission originally articulated
in the corporation’s formation documents? If the answer is somewhere in
between, so that nonprofit boards may variously deploy assets in response
to significant market changes, the question becomes at what point in this
middle ground state approval is required.
3. It Is Impracticable To Apply Charitable Trust Law to Nonprofit
Corporations
Finally, we explore the potential impact of wholesale importation of
charitable trust standards to govern oversight of the modern commercial
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enterprise. Strictly applied, charitable trust law would invite detailed
judicial review of all board decisions that implicate the nonprofit’s mission
and perhaps application of the cy pres doctrine to determine whether the
prior business activity under review has become impossible, inexpedient,
274
or impracticable, and whether the new business plan is as “near as
275
possible” to the settlor’s original intent. This approach would obviously
pose enormous practical difficulties for the court. For example,
ascertaining whether the settlor’s original intent has become impossible,
inexpedient, or impracticable to fulfill in the context of a multi-million
dollar commercial enterprise attempting to respond to a rapidly changing
health care market would be an enormously complicated, perhaps
intractable, inquiry. Also troublesome is the artificiality of determining the
“settlor’s intent” (are the settlors current taxpayers and donors or those
who supported the entity at the time of its establishment, or an
aggregation of all taxpayers?) from articles of incorporation that can be
decades if not a century old. It makes little sense to require the
corporation to remain as “near as possible” to its original mission when to
do so might result in economic demise, represent a misallocation of
significant health care resources, or is simply not in the best interest of the
community that is the current beneficiary of the nonprofit’s activities.
First, as is illustrated by this discussion, the notion that a trust
276
comprises a third party beneficiary contract between settlor and trustee is
a legal construction ill-conceived for the charitable corporate context.
Because the beneficiaries of the charitable corporation/trust cannot be
identified, they must be represented in parens patriae by the attorney
general. Unlike the private trust context, where the beneficiaries have a
clear incentive to monitor the trustees, and to litigate if the trustees fail in
277
their obligations,
attorneys general have neither access to the
information necessary to monitor the charitable corporation/trust, nor the
resources necessary to determine or pursue the beneficiaries’ interests.
Second, using trust law to oversee governance of nonprofit
corporations is inefficient. While trust law in the private trust context is
274. See generally FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 144, at 100.
275. In re Multiple Sclerosis Serv. Org., 68 N.Y.2d 32, 35 (1986).
276. Robert H. Skitoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621
(2004). Because the law of trusts incorporates both in rem benefits of property law and the
“in personam flexibility of contract law,” the alternative theory of trust law is grounded in
property law—that the trust conveys a beneficial interest in the trust property to the
beneficiaries. Id. at 629.
277. This argument obviously does not apply if the beneficiaries are as yet unborn, or are
incompetent. Id. at 663, 668.
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arguably the most efficient means of achieving the best interests of the
278
trusts beneficiaries “within the settlor’s legally permissible objectives,”
critics increasingly question whether trust law is efficient for charitable
279
Irrespective of how that debate is resolved, trust law
trusts.
unquestionably should not extend to the nonprofit corporation.
Finally, much of trust law, specifically, the duty of care, attends to
beneficiaries’ presumed lower “risk tolerance”; trustees are charged with
the preservation of the trust assets. By comparison, corporate law’s business
judgment gloss on the duty of care seeks to preserve boards’ risk-taking
280
instincts, all the better to pursue opportunities that will maximize profits.
Neither model is ideal for the nonprofit corporation, whose primary goal is
community service, irrespective of its profit potential, and without
necessary reference to asset valuation. On the other hand, nonprofit
health care providers are acutely aware that they cannot accomplish their
mission without financial wherewithal.
In sum, application of trust doctrine to nonprofit corporations is
analytically strained—no identifiable “settlor,” beneficiaries, or “trust
instrument” exists, so attorneys general and courts engage in a fictitious
analysis that is confusing at best. At worst, applying the inflexible standards
of trust law can be devastating to the economic survival of a significant
health care enterprise and might cause dissipation of the corporation’s
assets, which conflicts precisely with the ostensible goal of charitable trust.
4. Directors’ Duties in Transitions of Nonprofit Corporations
The case law evaluating directorial decisions regarding organic
changes gives mixed and conflicting guidance with respect to the proper
role of mission in that process. Most states appear to accept in principle
that corporate fiduciary standards should apply to nonprofit directors. Yet
developing a framework for allowing consideration of charitable purposes
in appropriate cases remains elusive. As the discussion of applying the
281
Revlon principle to nonprofit conversions illustrates,
in some
278. Skitoff explains that the trustees’ duty of impartiality as among different classes of
beneficiaries whose interests may conflict is the “salient distinguishing characteristic of trust
law as organizational law.” Id. at 652. This concept is likely inapplicable to the charitable
corporation unless, in the hospital context, patients and doctors are conceived of as
competing classes of beneficiaries.
279. See, e.g., Eisenstein, supra note 273. Eisenstein suggests that in some circumstances,
the public is best served by allowing the trust to fail. Id. at 1781-83.
280. See Skitoff, supra note 276, at 656-57.
281. See supra note 200.
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circumstances strict application of the corporate standard may fail to take
into account mission-related issues that should be appropriately
considered by directors in evaluating changes. At the same time, where
statutes or common law invite consideration of mission-related factors,
there is a real risk that regulators, courts and attorneys general will
substitute their judgments for the discretion of directors.
5. Impact
For managers of nonprofit health care enterprises, legal uncertainty
breeds inefficiency and impairs pursuit of charitable goals. Most obviously,
threats of second-guessing by charity regulators impede managers’ ability
to deploy assets and plan strategically in a dynamic health services market.
The interventions by the Minnesota and New York Attorneys General with
Allina, MEETH, and Littauer created uncertainty that pervades the
business decisions of the entire nonprofit health care sector in those states.
One can scarcely doubt that management, acutely aware that attorneys
general may question routine business expenditures, now asks itself how
282
everyday decisions might appear if they were widely publicized.
Moreover, interventions that question long-established business structures
raise significant policy questions. For example, the demand that Allina spin
off its HMO implicates the permissible relationships among the
component parts of an integrated delivery system and ultimately whether
an integrated delivery system is even possible. Further, the Attorney
General’s position in Allina questions whether the corporate purposes of a
system member may be subsumed by the system’s over-arching mission.
We have also seen that the role of mission in informing directors’
decision-making is quite ambiguous. When assessing whether boards have
satisfied their fiduciary responsibilities, courts and charity regulators
sometimes invoke mission responsibilities, and sometimes ignore them.
For example, the MEETH and Littauer decisions send mixed messages
about boards’ autonomy to interpret and direct their mission in New York.

282. As described in a recent New York Times article: “Charities and foundations have
been bracing for stronger regulatory intervention in their affairs, and many are already
taking steps to beef up their governance. . . .” Stephanie Strom, Questions About Some
Charities’ Activities Lead to a Push for Tighter Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, at 23; see
also Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 943 (describing numerous examples of activism
by attorneys general and concluding, that “should charities too quickly accede to state
demands over matters of discretionary governance, the sector as a whole can see a
degradation in charities’ willingness to take risks, and in volunteer board members’
willingness to serve”).
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Likewise, the legal posture assumed by the three attorneys general who
challenged Banner’s re-deployment of its assets across state lines threatens
the very existence of multi-state systems—these systems risk losing their
assets if they attempt to move them out of the local communities in which
they are currently invested. Further, a public policy requiring that the
assets of a charitable corporation constitute a trust belonging to the public
makes the entity less attractive as a potential strategic partner, which may
negatively affect the value of those assets.
At a more quotidian level, attorneys general’s overzealous prosecutions
may deter service on boards by just the kind of experienced professionals
that both state and federal regulators hope to see actively engaged in
corporate oversight. Further, nonprofit boards may be made excessively
risk-averse by the specter of overreaching regulatory oversight. Studies
suggest that they are prone to overestimate risk and be less inclined to
pursue innovative business strategies. Lacking financial incentives,
volunteer nonprofit directors appear to be driven by a combination of
social norms and their personal loyalty to the mission of the institution
they serve.
In this environment, it is important to remember the norm-shaping
impact of law. As scholarship has stressed, an important objective of the
283
law is to shift social norms and social meaning. As we have argued, this
role is particularly significant in nonprofit fiduciary law because of the
absence of financially interested monitors and the ambiguity surrounding
the objectives guiding corporate agents. With respect to health care
nonprofits, we conclude that the legal milieu in which they operate seems
inimical to fostering good stewardship. A legal regime that is slow to insist
on director vigilance but intrudes on decisions of central importance
regarding mission likely reinforces directorial abdication.
Finally, we consider the law of nonprofits from an institutional
perspective. Attorneys general play a complicated role in the current
environment. They fill a variety of roles with respect to the nonprofit
sector: prosecutor, consumer advocate, public representative as parens
patriae, supervisor of charitable trusts, regulator, and politically
284
accountable officer of the state. Abhorring a vacuum, many have
assumed a multi-faceted role in the oversight of the governance of

283. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, supra note 152, at 2043; Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and
Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998).
284. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 144, at 254-56 (enumerating common law and
statutory powers of the attorney general regarding charitable corporations and trusts);
Brody, Whose Public?, supra note 13, at 938-39.
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nonprofit organizations that extends far beyond enforcing fiduciary and
trust principles. As described in Part II, this has led some down a path to
micromanaging business affairs, seeking direct appointive power over
board positions, and parochial control over the redeployment of charitable
assets. From a health care policy perspective, it has also resulted in de facto
centralization of several important regulatory functions. Attorneys general
have used their leverage over nonprofits in asset sales, conversions, and
mergers to direct the geographic and service dimensions of the charitable
sector. As they candidly admit, attorneys general offices see themselves as
assuring an appropriate allocation of society’s scarce charitable resources,
and they freely use legal tools (and capitalize on the doctrinal ambiguities
in the law) to do so. One must seriously question, however, whether a
mandate exists for reposing so much discretion in that office and, even if it
did, whether attorneys general command the resources to responsibly
assume it.
We also speculate that attorney general activism may have untoward
spillover effects on other governmental actors. Given the centralization of
authority in the attorneys general, it is perhaps not surprising that states
have not felt impelled to forthrightly consider the difficult issues posed by
the changing landscape of charitable health care. Most states have
weakened or abandoned certificate of need review; hospital closings are
not closely supervised; and the preservation of the health care safety net is
largely unattended. Thus, few departments of health actively supervise the
geographical locations of charitable health facilities or the range of
services they offer. These are public policy tasks essential to maintaining a
viable health care system that are properly vested in state departments of
health, which should not abdicate their responsibilities to attorneys
general offices that are wholly unequipped to fill this function.
V. CONCLUSION: A PROPOSAL FOR MISSION PRIMACY
Our review of the application of fiduciary and charitable trust law to
nonprofit health care corporations has identified a number of significant
problems. First, there is widespread confusion about the boundaries
between those bodies of law. Difficulties are compounded by the impact of
those laws on the health sector—notably the uneasy fit of importing
wholesale for-profit corporate principles to govern entities having
decidedly different attributes and goals, and the inappropriateness of
using rigid trust concepts to guide management of dynamic commercial
enterprises. This confusion has led to opportunism among certain
attorneys general who have sought judicial relief, which inappropriately
transfers power over business and mission decisions to them. It has also
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spawned uncertainty in business planning that may weaken the nonprofit
sector’s ability to serve its societal purposes. Finally, ambiguity about the
role of boards and attorneys general may have diverted health
policymakers and regulators from dealing squarely with the central task of
fairly and efficiently allocating charitable assets.
As discussed throughout this Article, commercial nonprofits in health
delivery and payment must anticipate and respond to demographic shifts,
reimbursement reform, and technical innovation. Attorneys general
should not usurp departments of health and insurance, which are the
agencies properly responsible for ensuring that the business climate in
which providers and payors operate can supply high quality and affordable
health care. To give a concrete example, attorneys general’s insistence that
nonprofit hospitals forever adhere to their original purpose of serving the
local community as a free-standing acute care facility can have detrimental
long-term consequences for that community’s access to appropriate health
care. It may force them to forgo the efficiencies, stability, and capital
accruing from affiliation with a financially strong national system; or it may
deny the community a sensible re-deployment of its charitable assets, e.g.
from acute care hospital services to disease prevention or outpatient
clinics. A final concern, focusing on institutional competence, is that the
attorney general’s office lacks the expertise, resources, and legal mandate
to micro-manage business affairs of commercial enterprises or to macromanage the allocation of health services within the community.
This Part offers several core principles that should guide future
judicial, legislative, and regulatory adjustments affecting nonprofit health
care organizations. Admittedly, few of the problems we have identified are
subject to easy correction by isolated changes, e.g., judicial interpretation
of doctrine, attorney general forbearance, or modest legislative
adjustments. What we offer below, however, can provide a useful first step:
guidance as to the central issues that should be addressed in redefining
nonprofit accountability so as to ensure that governmental oversight is
both coordinated and appropriate.
A. Principles for Reorienting Nonprofit Organization Law and Policy
The complex tangle identified in this article of confused doctrine, lack
of managerial accountability, and overreaching by attorneys general poses
challenges for all branches of government dealing with nonprofit
governance. Because there is so much variation in state law in this area, a
precise road map for implementing change is impossible. However, we
identify below three core principles to guide legislatures, courts, and
regulators as they move toward developing governance standards for
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nonprofit enterprises in health care.
Our analysis takes as a starting point that the evidence of modest
benefits flowing from the nonprofit sector supports continued reliance on
legal mechanisms that enable and require those institutions to achieve
285
their charitable missions. At the same time, the record of community
benefits is not so compelling as to support use of legal tools to preserve
286
nonprofit entities at any cost.
1. Ownership and Accountability
The fundamental question of who, broadly speaking, “owns” the
nonprofit corporation merits close attention. Many questions, such as
defining and evaluating community benefit, ascertaining directors’
obligations under changing conditions, and enumerating the rights and
obligations of controlling members, cannot be addressed without a clearer
understanding of to whom (or what) nonprofit fiduciaries should be
accountable. As discussed above, corporate scholars continue to debate
whether for-profit governance should adopt a model of shareholder
primacy, director primacy, or some other objective function reflecting
societal goals that underlie the corporate form. In the nonprofit sector, the
287
debate has scarcely moved in the last twenty years. The absence of
discussion is remarkable because the issue is, if anything, more pointed for
nonprofits than for commercial profit corporations. That is, lacking
shareholders, the candidates for primacy are a more diffuse and
amorphous group: the class of beneficiaries to be served by the charity; the
directors who manage those objectives; members, where present; donors
and taxpayers; or the representative of the public beneficiary class such as
the Attorney General. Moreover, the absence of the disciplining effect of a
capital market or vigilant, interested shareholders to vindicate abuses in
court exacerbates the agency costs inherent in the nonprofit form. At the
same time, the similarities between the commercial nonprofit sector and
the for-profit sector are also striking. Commercial nonprofits do not rely

285. See supra Part I.
286. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Should the Law Prefer Nonprofits?, in THE PRIVATIZATION
OF HEALTH CARE REFORM 186 (M. Gregg Bloche ed., 2003).
287. Evelyn Brody’s impressive body of scholarship has addressed these issues. As she
summarizes the dilemma, “[N]onprofit ‘accountability’ is a difficult question. Accountable
to whom? For what? While nonprofits as suppliers of goods and services must respond to
their customers, and as employers must respond to their professional staffs and employees,
the same types of resource dependency affect for-profit firms.” Brody, Agents Without
Principals, supra note 18, at 534-35 (footnote omitted).
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heavily on donations and, from a financial standpoint, are driven by a need
288
to satisfy customers in the marketplace.
The failure of courts and commentators to resolve questions of
ownership and mission accountability is in part explained by the plurality
of competing interests. Starting with the perspective that tax expenditures
and legal support create a strong public entitlement, some regard the
public at large (or its representative) as the appropriate locus of
accountability. Others identify as the appropriate party in interest the
beneficiaries of the nonprofit’s charitable mission. Still others advocate
including the “patrons”—donors and customers who provide the financial
wherewithal to fulfilling the nonprofit’s charitable mission. Finally, there is
the perspective of the “sponsor” or “member” of the nonprofit
corporation, whose control and support keep the enterprise running.
Choosing among these competing parties in interest is ultimately a
normative and political question that underlies any workable definition of
“accountability.” As Evelyn Brody framed the issue: “Who are the
289
‘principals’ to whom society wants the charity to answer . . . ?” Like many
before us, we will dodge that question. Instead we offer a framework for
allowing courts and legislatures to address the issue by allocating
presumptive decisionmaking authority to those entrusted with serving the
nonprofit’s purposes, but insisting that they follow clearly articulated
mission statements.
As a general guiding principle, we suggest that “mission primacy”
should be recognized as a central objective of the nonprofit enterprise with
the corollary that directors enjoy presumptive deference in defining and,
within limits, amending that mission. This focus would incorporate
mission-centered values into interpretations of the traditional fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty. At the same time, like the model of “director
290
primacy” advanced for proprietary corporations,
it would preserve
managerial discretion to balance the various constituents of the nonprofit
firm including donors, consumers, and the community. Consequently, this
standard would accommodate the relational imperatives of the modern
business environment in health care by deferring to managerial expertise,
avoiding interference with discretionary judgments, and encouraging

288. Id. at 535 (“Effectively, then, nonprofits are generally as untethered to their donors
as large for-profit firms are to their shareholders.”); id at 536 (“In many ways, the formal
legal and economic differences between nonprofit organizations and proprietary firms are
more of degree than of kind.”).
289. Id. at 512.
290. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 148, at 192-240.
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appropriate risk-taking. Finally, mission primacy accounts for the particular
circumstances of nonprofit governance because it preserves the central
values of trust and volunteerism that are needed to reinforce legal duties.
Mission primacy, then, would extend the concept of the duty of
obedience to underscore directors’ core responsibilities as stewards of a
nonprofit enterprise to advance its public purpose. It has been seen that by
embracing the for-profit corporate model, nonprofit governance law has
often blindly applied fiduciary norms that neglect mission values entirely.
Our approach would hold directors to a fiduciary standard that requires
them to weigh mission considerations in all decisions. At the same time,
however, by requiring courts to grant deference to directors’ judgments,
the rule would reduce risks of unwarranted judicial interference and
preserve the norm-shaping role of fiduciary law. Thus, mission primacy
would allow legitimate mission-centered factors to override corporate
fiduciary standards in some cases while imposing a more exacting standard
of care or loyalty where mission issues predominate. Several examples will
serve to illustrate the way in which mission primacy would affect
application of fiduciary duties.
In cases involving organic change, such as the hospital closure at issue
in MEETH, mission primacy would mandate consideration of and
deference to the board’s evaluation of mission, and its determination of
291
the most appropriate means to accomplish that mission. Where a board’s
actions are questioned under duty of care or loyalty standards, mission
factors may help give content to the inchoate considerations that
contribute to the board’s deliberation. Likewise, mission primacy may
compel deference in the economically important cases involving multistate charitable corporations consolidating their holdings, or whose
mission calls for the reallocation of revenues from profit-producing
facilities to facilities in financially distressed communities, irrespective of
whether such aid crosses state lines.
Mission primacy would not affect the attorney general’s extant
authority to ensure compliance with the duty of care by appropriate due
diligence, particularly when a board decides to dispose of the charity’s
assets. However, it would prevent courts from blindly applying corporate

291. In this regard mission primacy would likely have required a less categorical
evaluation of purpose in MEETH. See Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715
N.Y.S.2d 575, 595 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“[I]t is sophistry to contend that this means that MEETH
is not seeking a new and fundamentally different purpose . . . .”). This approach is more in
keeping with the court’s approach in Littauer, discussed supra notes 12, 77, 79 and
accompanying text.
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principles in a manner that overlooks mission entirely. For example,
charitable corporations selling their assets frequently find themselves
courted by prospective buyers with diverse missions, whose offers vary
dramatically. As discussed above, some would apply the Revlon doctrine to
nonprofits, thus imposing an obligation on directors to sell for the highest
price and ignore mission-based considerations, once a decision to sell the
292
corporation has been made. Mission primacy would avoid this trap,
allowing a nonprofit board to weigh mission preservation against price,
and to select a buyer whose offer best accommodates both of these
concerns.
2. Clarify the Charitable Trust/Corporate Law Boundary
This Article counsels strongly against states’ reliance on charitable
trust law to regulate nonprofit assets, except, of course, where an express
trust exists. We have argued that applying charitable trust law to corporate
assets is doctrinally unsound and produces outcomes that potentially waste,
rather than preserve, scarce charitable assets. The alternative approach,
adopted by most of the courts to have directly addressed the issue, is to
look to corporate law as the foundation for the law governing all aspects of
charitable corporations. While this reflects our preferred doctrinal path,
recognition of the mission primacy principle proposed above is necessary
to assure that both boards and charity regulators observe core nonprofit
purposes.
Clarifying that corporate law governs disputes involving nonprofit
business decisions would remove an important obstacle to efficient
business planning by multi-state entities in most cases. Thus, corporate
analysis with a focus on mission would likely have resulted in Banner being
able to re-deploy its assets to Colorado and Arizona with relative ease.
Except for the circumstances where express trusts existed, Banner’s
holdings should not otherwise have been impressed with a trust—
traditional trust doctrine does not support the imposition of a trust on the
basis of generalized donations or tax subsidies. In some circumstances,
legislative action would be required to assure corporate principles prevail;
for example, in the Banner litigation, the South Dakota Supreme Court
recently decided that the enactment of the nonprofit corporate statute did
293
not preempt the pre-existing charitable trust statutory or common law.
Clarification of the rather murky doctrine of implied charitable trust in

292. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
293. Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 247 (S.D. 2003).
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those states that recognize the concept would also serve to remove
uncertainty in this area.
Recognizing that the corporate standard has not been a model of
successful prophylactic law in the for-profit sector, it might be appropriate
to adjust fiduciary standards applicable to nonprofits in some
circumstances. For example, most state nonprofit corporate statutes bar
loans to directors, a development that long preceded parallel
developments in the for-profit sector under Sarbanes-Oxley law. Moreover,
an evolving recognition that the business judgment rule’s impact should be
tempered by requiring good faith and informed decision-making should
294
be encouraged. Further, administrative improvements may well be
needed to assure that fiduciary derelictions are detected and remedied. At
the same time, enhanced enforcement mechanisms must be carefully
designed so as not to undermine the social norms that play a critical role
295
in assuring fiduciary performance.
While regulatory interventions in the health care sector would have to
be sensitive to the multiple regulatory entities sharing oversight of the
sector, it is unquestionably the case that states need to invest the resources
in some charity agency that will provide better regulatory guidance to the
nonprofit sector, and will review the increasingly available information
about nonprofit entities to detect potential problems.
3. Clarify and Delineate State Agencies’ Supervisory Responsibilities
Viewed from the perspective of health care policy, the most
important—and most vexing—public policy question emanating from our
analysis of charitable nonprofit law is how the law can best achieve the
appropriate distribution of health care resources. These concerns
undoubtedly drive attorneys general to undertake many of the actions for
which we take them to task in this Article. Simply stated, the problem we
identify in this regard is one of institutional competence and transparency.
To the extent that there are market failures, there are alternative and
more focused means of regulation and allocation including licensure,
certificate of need regulation, and subsidies from state departments of
294. See cases listed supra note 159 and accompanying text.
295. James Fishman has usefully advanced the idea of employing a charity commission
that would operate under the aegis of the attorney general to review complaints about
charitable corporations. Fishman, supra note 127, at 266-72 (reviewing the scope of
proposals and changes made by nonprofit experts). The attorney general’s office would
only be required to become involved where a viable complaint could not be resolved at the
commission level. Id. at 272-75.
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health; exercise of the state’s tax-exemption powers; and contracting by
state entities funding health services. Without expressing a preference for
any particular regulatory regime, we believe that policy-making through
these agencies is preferable because it is more likely to identify and
evaluate deficits in safety net services. By contrast, allocating broad and
unrestricted discretion to attorneys general to make allocative decisions
behind a veil of corporate or charitable trust litigation appears to be a
296
recipe for ad hoc and inefficient decision-making. Whatever oversight
agenda of the charitable sector a state attorney general decides to pursue,
we view it as essential that the office clearly articulate its public policy
concerns, expectations, and standards of review. The need for such
guidance is particularly acute if attorneys general intend to assert standing
on mission issues, for which there is virtually no precedent to guide
nonprofit boards.
Our final point concerns problems that flow from attorneys general
seeking to replace directors, or to appoint a “super-board” with veto or
special administrative powers. Such appointments provoke charges of
political cronyism, which threatens the private and necessarily non-political
nature of nonprofit tax-exempt charities. More important, political
appointments to charitable boards create inherent conflicts for the
appointees—whether they are bound to act as they independently believe
appropriate to fulfill their fiduciary duties, or whether they are required to
pursue the preferences of the regulator who appointed them. The
inevitable blurring of the line between public and private accountability
occasioned by these interventions threatens to undermine director
discretion; quite startlingly, rather than improving accountability to
mission, it shifts director fealty to the interests of political officials.

296. We acknowledge the myriad problems surrounding efficient deployment of
charitable resources. Certificate of Need processes, which were originally intended to
reduce health care expenditures and eliminate inequitable distribution of resources by
regulating significant capital investments on new facilities or equipment, currently exists in
fewer than half the states. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV.
247, 298 (2003); Lauretta Higgins Wolfson, State Regulation of Health Facility Planning: The
Economic Theory and Political Realities of Certificate of Need, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 261,
261-62 (2001).
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